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Abstract. Priced timed games are two-player zero-sum games played on priced timed
automata (whose locations and transitions are labeled by weights modelling the price of
spending time in a state and executing an action, respectively). The goals of the players are
to minimise and maximise the price to reach a target location, respectively. We consider
priced timed games with one clock and arbitrary integer weights and show that, for an
important subclass of theirs (the so-called simple priced timed games), one can compute,
in exponential time, the optimal values that the players can achieve, with their associated
optimal strategies. As side results, we also show that one-clock priced timed games are
determined and that we can use our result on simple priced timed games to solve the more
general class of so-called negative-reset-acyclic priced timed games (with arbitrary integer
weights and one clock). The decidability status of the full class of priced timed games with
one-clock and arbitrary integer weights still remains open.
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Figure 1: A simple priced timed game (left) and the lower value function of location ℓ1
(right). Transitions without label have weight 0.
1. Introduction
Game theory is nowadays a well-established framework in theoretical computer science,
enabling computer-aided design of computer systems that are correct-by-construction. It
allows one to describe and analyse the possible interactions of antagonistic agents (or players)
as in the controller synthesis problem, for instance. This problem asks, given a model of the
environment of a system, and of the possible actions of a controller, to compute a controller
that constraints the environment to respect a given specification. Clearly, one cannot assume
in general that the two players (the environment and the controller) will collaborate, hence
the need to find a strategy for the controller that enforces the specification whatever the
environment does. This question thus reduces to computing a so-called winning strategy for
the corresponding player in the game model.
In order to describe precisely the features of complex computer systems, several game
models have been considered in the literature. In this work, we focus on the model of Priced
Timed Games (PTGs for short), which can be regarded as an extension (in several directions)
of classical finite automata. First, like timed automata [2], PTGs have clocks, which are
real-valued variables whose values evolve with time elapsing, and which can be tested and
reset along the transitions. Second, the locations are associated with weights representing
rates and transitions are labeled by discrete weights, as in priced timed automata [3, 4, 5].
These weights allow one to associate a price with each run (or play), which depends on the
sequence of transitions traversed by the run, and on the time spent in each visited location.
Finally, a PTG is played by two players, called Min and Max, and each location of the game
is owned by either of them (we consider a turn-based version of the game). The player who
controls the current location decides how long to wait, and which transition to take.
In this setting, the goal ofMin is to reach a given set of target locations, while minimising
the price of the play to reach such a location. Player Max has an antagonistic objective:
it tries to avoid the target locations, and, if not possible, to maximise the accumulated price
up to the first visit of a target location. To reflect these objectives, we define the upper
value Val of the game as a mapping of the configurations of the PTG to the least price that
Min can guarantee while reaching the target, whatever the choices of Max. Similarly, the
lower value Val returns the greatest price that Max can ensure (letting the price be +∞ in
case the target locations are not reached).
An example of PTG is given in Figure 1, where the locations of Min and Max are
represented by circles and rectangles respectively. The integers next to the locations are
their rates, i.e. the price of spending one time unit in the location. Moreover, there is only
one clock x in the game, which is never reset, and all guards on transitions are x ∈ [0, 1]
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(hence this guard is not displayed and transitions are only labelled by their respective
discrete weight): this is an example of a simple priced timed game (we will define them
properly later). It is easy to check that Min can force reaching the target location ℓf
from all configurations (ℓ, ν) of the game, where ℓ is a location and ν is a real value of
the clock in [0, 1]. Let us comment on the optimal strategies for both players. From a
configuration (ℓ4, ν), with ν ∈ [0, 1], Max better waits until the clock takes value 1, before
taking the transition to ℓf (it is forced to move, by the rules of the game). Hence, Max’s
optimal value is 3(1 − ν) − 7 = −3ν − 4 from all configurations (ℓ4, ν). Symmetrically,
it is easy to check that Min better waits as long as possible in ℓ7, hence its optimal value
is −16(1−ν) from all configurations (ℓ7, ν). However, optimal value functions are not always
that simple, see for instance the lower value function of ℓ1 on the bottom of Figure 1, which
is a piecewise affine function. To understand why value functions can be piecewise affine,
consider the sub-game enclosed in the dotted rectangle in Figure 1, and consider the value
that Min can guarantee from a configuration of the form (ℓ3, ν) in this sub-game. Clearly,
Min must decide how long it will spend in ℓ3 and whether it will go to ℓ4 or ℓ7. Its optimal
value from all (ℓ3, ν) is thus
inf
06t61−ν
min
(
4t+ 3(1 − (ν + t))− 7, 4t+ 6− 16(1 − (ν + t))
)
= min(−3ν − 4, 16ν − 10) .
Since 16ν − 10 > −3ν − 4 if and only if ν 6 6/19, the best choice of Min is to move
instantaneously to ℓ7 if ν ∈ [0, 6/19] and to move instantaneously to ℓ4 if ν ∈ (6/19, 1],
hence the value function of ℓ3 (in the sub-game) is a piecewise affine function with two
pieces.
Related work. PTGs are a special case of hybrid games [6, 7, 8], independently investi-
gated in [9] and [10]. For (non-necessarily turn-based) PTGs with non-negative weights,
semi-algorithms are given to decide the value problem that is to say, whether the upper
value of a location (the best price that Min can guarantee starting with a clock value 0), is
below a given threshold. It was also shown that, under the strongly non-Zeno assumption on
weights (asking the existence of κ > 0 such that every cycle in the underlying region graph
has a weight at least κ), the proposed semi-algorithms always terminate. This assumption
was justified in [11, 12] by showing that, without it, the existence problem, that is to de-
cide whether Min has a strategy guaranteeing to reach a target location with a price below
a given threshold, is indeed undecidable for PTGs with non-negative weights and three or
more clocks. This result was recently extended in [13] to show that the value problem is also
undecidable for PTGs with non-negative weights and four or more clocks. In [14], the unde-
cidability of the existence problem has also been shown for PTGs with arbitrary weights on
locations (without weights on transitions), and two or more clocks. On a positive side, the
value problem was shown decidable by [15] for PTGs with one clock when the weights are
non-negative: a 3-exponential time algorithm was first proposed, further refined in [16, 17]
into an exponential time algorithm. The key point of those algorithms is to reduce the
problem to the computation of optimal values in a restricted family of PTGs called Simple
Priced Timed Games (SPTGs for short), where the underlying automata contain no guard,
no reset, and the play is forced to stop after one time unit. More precisely, the PTG is de-
composed into a sequence of SPTGs whose value functions are computed and re-assembled
to yield the value function of the original PTG. Alternatively, and with radically different
techniques, a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm to solve one-clock PTGs with arbitrary
weights on transitions, and rates restricted to two values amongst {−d, 0,+d} (with d ∈ N)
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was given in [18]. More recently, a large subclass of PTGs with arbitrary weights and no
restrictions on the number of clocks was introduced in [19], whose value can be computed in
double-exponential time: they are defined via a partition of strongly connected components
with respect to the sign of all the cycles they contain. A survey summarising results on
PTGs can be found in [20].
Contributions. Following the decidability results sketched above, we consider PTGs with
one clock. We extend those results by considering arbitrary (positive and negative) weights.
Indeed, all previous works on PTGs with only one clock (except [18]) have considered non-
negative weights only, and the status of the more general case with arbitrary weights has so
far remained elusive. Yet, arbitrary weights are an important modelling feature. Consider,
for instance, a system which can consume but also produce energy at different rates. In this
case, energy consumption could be modelled as a positive rate, and production by a negative
rate. In the untimed setting, such extension to negative weights has been considered in
[21, 22]: our result heavily builds upon techniques investigated in these works, as we will
see later. Our main contribution is an exponential time algorithm to compute the value of
one-clock SPTGs with arbitrary weights. While this result might sound limited due to the
restricted class of simple PTGs we can handle, we recall that the previous works mentioned
above [15, 16, 17] have demonstrated that solving SPTGs is a key result towards solving
more general PTGs. Moreover, this algorithm is, as far as we know, the first to handle
the full class of SPTGs with arbitrary weights, and we note that the solutions (either the
algorithms or the proofs) known so far do not generalise to this case. Finally, as a side
result, this algorithm allows us to solve the more general class of negative-reset-acyclic one-
clock PTGs that we introduce. Thus, the whole class of PTGs with arbitrary weights and
one clock remains open so far, our result may be seen as a potentially important milestone
towards this goal.
2. Quantitative reachability games
The semantics of the priced timed games we study in this work can be expressed in the
setting of quantitative reachability games as defined below. Intuitively, in such a game, two
players (Min and Max) play by changing alternatively the current configuration of the game.
The game ends when it reaches a final configuration, and Min has to pay a price associated
with the sequence of configurations and of transitions taken (hence, it is trying to minimise
this price).
Note that the framework of quantitative reachability games that we develop here (and
for which we prove a determinacy result, see Theorem 1) can be applied to other settings
than priced timed games. For example, special cases of quantitative reachability games are
finite quantitative reachability games—where the set of configurations is finite—that have
been thoroughly studied in [22] under the name of min-cost reachability games. In this
article, we will rely on quantitative reachability games with uncountably many states as the
semantics of priced timed games. Similarly, our quantitative reachability games could be
used to formalise the semantics of hybrid games [23, 24] or any (non-probabilistic) game
with a reachability objective.
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Definition 1 (Quantitative reachability games). A quantitative reachability game is a tuple
G = (C = CMin ⊎CMax,Σ, E, F, p), where C is the set of configurations (that does not need
to be finite, nor countable), partitioned into the set CMin of configurations of player Min,
and the set CMax of configurations of player Max; Σ is a (potentially infinite) alphabet whose
elements are called letters; E ⊆ C × Σ × C is the transition relation; F ⊆ C is the set of
final configurations; and p : (CΣ)∗C → R maps each finite sequence c1a1 · · · ancn+1 to a real
number called the price of c1a1 · · · ancn+1.
For the sake of exposure, we assume that there are no deadlocks in the game, i.e. for all
configurations c ∈ C, there exists c′ ∈ C and a ∈ Σ such that (c, a, c′) ∈ E. A finite play is
a finite sequence ρ = c1a1c2 · · · cn alternating between configurations and letters, and such
that for all i < n: (ci, ai, ci+1) ∈ E. In this case, we let |ρ| = n be the length of the finite
play. A play is an infinite sequence ρ = c1a1c2 · · · alternating between configurations and
letters satisfying the same condition, i.e. for all i > 1: (ci, ai, ci+1) ∈ E. In that case, we
let |ρ| be the least position i such that ci ∈ F , and |ρ| = +∞ if there is no such position.
For the sake of clarity, we denote a play c1a1c2 · · · as c1
a1−→ c2 · · · , and similarly for finite
plays.
We take the viewpoint of player Min who wants to reach a final configuration. Thus,
the price of a play ρ = c1
a1−→ c2 · · · , denoted Price(ρ) is either +∞ if |ρ| = +∞ (this
is the worst situation for Min, which explains why the price is maximal in this case); or
p(c1
a1−→ c2 · · · cn) if |ρ| = n.
A strategy for player Min is a function σMin mapping all finite plays ending in a config-
uration c ∈ CMin to a transition (c, a, c
′) ∈ E. Strategies σMax of player Max are defined
accordingly. We let StratMin(G) and StratMax(G) be the sets of strategies of Min and Max,
respectively. A pair (σMin, σMax) ∈ StratMin(G)× StratMax(G) is called a profile of strategies.
Together with an initial configuration c1, it defines a unique play Play(c1, σMin, σMax) =
c1
a1−→ c2 · · · such that for all i > 0: (ci, ai, ci+1) = σMin(c1
a1−→ c2 · · · ci) if ci ∈ CMin; and
(ci, ai, ci+1) = σMax(c1
a1−→ c2 · · · ci) if ci ∈ CMax. We let Play(σMin) be the set of plays
that conform with σMin. That is, c1
a1−→ c2 · · · ∈ Play(σMin) iff for all i > 0: ci ∈ CMin im-
plies (ci, ai, ci+1) = σMin(c1
a1−→ c2 · · · ci). We let Play(c1, σMin) be the subset of plays from
Play(σMin) that start in c1. We define Play(σMax) and Play(c1, σMax) accordingly. Given an
initial configuration c1, the price of a strategy σMin of Min is:
Price(c1, σMin) = sup
ρ∈Play(c1,σMin)
Price(ρ) .
It matches the intuition to be the largest price that Min may pay while following strat-
egy σMin. This definition is equal to supσMax Price(Play(c1, σMin, σMax)), which is intuitively
the highest price that Max can force Min to pay if Min follows σMin. Similarly, given a
strategy σMax of Max, we define the price of σMax as:
Price(c1, σMax) = inf
ρ∈Play(c1,σMax)
Price(ρ) = inf
σMin
Price(Play(c1, σMin, σMax)) .
It corresponds to the least price that Min can achieve once Max has fixed its strategy σMax.
From there, two different definitions of the value of a configuration c1 arise, depending
on which player chooses its strategy first. The upper value of c1, defined as:
Val(c1) = inf
σMin
sup
σMax
Price(Play(c1, σMin, σMax)) ,
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corresponds to the least price that Min can ensure when choosing its strategy before Max,
while the lower value, defined as:
Val(c1) = sup
σMax
inf
σMin
Price(Play(c1, σMin, σMax)) ,
corresponds to the least price that Min can ensure when choosing its strategy after Max. It
is easy to see that Val(c1) 6 Val(c1), which explains the chosen names. Indeed, if Min picks
its strategy after Max, it has more information, and then can, in general, choose a better
response.
In general, the order in which players choose their strategies can modify the outcome
of the game. However, for quantitative reachability games, this makes no difference, and
the value is the same whichever player picks its strategy first. This result, known as the
determinacy property, is formalised here:
Theorem 1 (Determinacy of quantitative reachability games). For all quantitative reach-
ability games G and configurations c1, Val(c1) = Val(c1).
Proof. To establish this result, we rely on a general determinacy result of Donald Martin [25].
This result concerns qualitative games (i.e. games where players either win or lose the game,
and do not pay a price), called Gale-Stewart games. So, we first explain how to reduce
a quantitative reachability game G = (C = CMin ⊎ CMax,Σ, E, F, p) to a family of such
Gale-Stewart games Threshold(G, r) parametrised by a threshold r ∈ R.
The Gale-Stewart game Threshold(G, r) is played on an infinite tree whose vertices are
owned by either of the players. A play is then a maximal branch in this tree, built as follows:
the player who owns the root of the tree first picks a successor of the root that becomes
the current vertex. Then, the player who owns this vertex gets to choose a successor that
becomes the current one, etc. The game ends when a leaf is reached, where the winner is
declared thanks to a given set Win of winning leaves.
In our case, the vertices of Threshold(G, r) are the finite plays c1
a1−→ c2 · · · cn of G
starting from configuration c1. Such a vertex v = c1
a1−→ c2 · · · cn is owned by Min iff cn ∈
CMin; otherwise v belongs to Max. A vertex v = c1
a1−→ c2 · · · cn has successors iff cn 6∈ F .
In this case, the successors of v are all the vertices v
a
−→ c such that (cn, a, c) ∈ E. Finally,
a leaf c1
a1−→ c2 · · · cn (thus, with cn ∈ F ) is winning for Min iff p(c1
a1−→ c2 · · · cn) 6 r.
As a consequence, the set of winning plays in Threshold(G, r) is:
Win =
⋃
v∈L s.t. p(v)6r
{branch(v)}
where L is the set of leaves of Threshold(G, r), and branch(v) is the (unique) branch from
c1 to v. Then, we rewrite the definition of Win as:
Win =
⋃
v∈L s.t. p(v)6r
Cone(v)
where Cone(v) is the set of plays in Threshold(G, r) that visit v. Indeed, when v is a leaf,
the set Cone(v) reduces to the singleton containing only branch(v). Thus, the set of winning
plays (for Min) is an open set, defined in the topology generated from the Cone(v) sets, and
we can apply [25] to conclude that Threshold(G, r) is a determined game for all quantitative
reachability games G and all thresholds r ∈ R i.e. either Min or Max has a winning strategy
from the root of the tree. Moreover, notice that Min wins the game Threshold(G, r) iff it
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guarantees in G an upper value Val(c1) 6 r. Similarly, Max wins the game Threshold(G, r)
iff it guarantees in G a lower value Val(c1) > r.
We rely on this result to prove that Val(c1) > Val(c1) in G (the other inequality holds
by definition of Val(c1) and Val(c1)). We consider two cases:
(1) If Val(c1) = −∞, then, since Val(c1) 6 Val(c1), we have Val(c1) = −∞ too.
(2) If Val(c1) > −∞, consider any real number r such that r < Val(c1). Therefore, Min loses
in the game Threshold(G, r). By determinacy, Max wins in this game, i.e. Val(c1) > r.
Therefore, r < Val(c1) implies r 6 Val(c1): since this holds for all r, we have Val(c1) 6
Val(c1).
Now that we have showed that quantitative reachability games are determined, we can
denote by Val the value of the game, defined as Val = Val = Val.
3. Priced timed games
We are now ready to formally introduce the core model of this article: priced timed games.
We start by the formal definition, then study some properties of the value function of those
games (Section 3.2). Next, we introduce the restricted class of simple priced timed games
(Section 3.3) and close this section by discussing some special strategies (called switching
strategies) that we will rely upon in our algorithms to solve priced timed games.
3.1. Notations and definitions. As usual, we let N, Z, Q, R, and R+ be the set of non-
negative integers, integers, rational numbers, real numbers, and non-negative real numbers
respectively. We also let R = R ∪ {+∞,−∞}. Let x denote a positive real-valued variable
called clock. A guard (or clock constraint) is an interval with endpoints in N ∪ {+∞}. We
often abbreviate guards, writing for instance x 6 5 instead of [0, 5]. The set of all guards
on the clock x is called Guard(x). Let S ⊆ Guard(x) be a finite set of guards. We let
[[S]] =
⋃
I∈S I. Assuming M0 = 0 < M1 < · · · < Mk are all the endpoints of the intervals
in S (to which we add 0 if needed), we let
RegS = {(Mi,Mi+1) | 0 6 i 6 k − 1} ∪ {{Mi} | 0 6 i 6 k}
be the set of regions of S. Observe that RegS is also a set of guards.
We rely on the notion of cost function to formalise the notion of optimal value function
sketched in the introduction. Formally, for a set of guards S ⊆ Guard(x), a cost function
over S is a function f : [[RegS ]]→ R such that over each region r ∈ RegS , f is either infinite
or it is a continuous piecewise affine function with a finite set of cutpoints (points where the
first derivative is not defined) {κ1, . . . , κp} ⊆ Q, and satisfying f(κi) ∈ Q for all 1 6 i 6 p.
In particular, if f(r) = {f(ν) | ν ∈ r} contains +∞ (respectively, −∞) for some region r,
then f(r) = {+∞} (f(r) = {−∞}). We denote by CFS the set of all cost functions over S.
In our algorithm to solve SPTGs, we will need to combine cost functions thanks to
the ⊲ operator. Let f ∈ CFS and f
′ ∈ CFS′ be two cost functions on sets of guards
S, S′ ⊆ Guard(x), such that [[S]] ∩ [[S′]] is a singleton. We let f ⊲ f ′ be the cost function
in CFS∪S′ such that (f ⊲ f
′)(ν) = f(ν) for all ν ∈ [[RegS ]], and (f ⊲ f
′)(ν) = f ′(ν) for all
ν ∈ [[RegS′ ]] \ [[RegS ]]. For example, let S = {{0}, (0, 1), {1}} and S
′ = {{1}}. We define
the cost functions f1 and f2 such that f1 is equal to +∞ on the set of regions RegS and f2
is equal to 0 on the set of regions RegS′ . The cost function f2 ⊲ f1 ∈ CFS∪S′ is equal to
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+∞ on [0, 1) and to 0 on {1} and the cost function f1 ⊲ f2 ∈ CFS′ is equal to +∞ on [0, 1].
Thus f1 ⊲ f2 is equal to f1 while f2 ⊲ f1 extends f2 with a +∞ value on [0, 1).
We consider an extended notion of one-clock priced timed games (PTGs for short)
allowing for the use of urgent locations, where only a zero delay can be spent, and final cost
functions which are associated with all final locations and incur an extra cost to be paid
when ending the game in this location:
Definition 2. A priced timed game (PTG for short) G is a tuple (LMin, LMax, Lf , Lu,ϕ,∆, π)
where:
• LMin and LMax are finite sets of locations belonging respectively to player Min and Max.
We assume LMin ∩ LMax = ∅ and let L = LMin ∪ LMax be the set of all locations of the
PTG;
• Lf ⊆ L is a finite set of final locations;
• Lu ⊆ L \ Lf is the set of urgent locations
1;
• ∆ ⊆ (L \ Lf ) × Guard(x) × {⊤,⊥} × L is a finite set of transitions. We denote by
SG = {I | ∃ℓ,R, ℓ
′ : (ℓ, I,R, ℓ′) ∈ ∆} the set of all guards occurring on some transitions
of the PTG;
• ϕ = (ϕℓ)ℓ∈Lf associates to all locations ℓ ∈ Lf a final cost function, that is an affine
2 cost
function ϕℓ with rational coefficients;
• π : L∪∆→ Z is a mapping associating an integer weight to all locations and transitions.
Intuitively, a transition (ℓ, I,R, ℓ′) changes the current location from ℓ to ℓ′ if the clock
has value in I and the clock is reset according to the Boolean R. We assume that, in all
PTGs, the clock x is bounded, i.e. there isM ∈ N such that for all guards I ∈ SG , I ⊆ [0,M ].
3
We denote by RegG the set RegSG of regions of G. We further denote
4 by ΠtrG , Π
loc
G and
ΠfinG respectively the values maxδ∈∆ |π(δ)|, maxℓ∈L |π(ℓ)| and supν∈[0,M ]maxℓ∈L |ϕℓ(ν)| =
maxℓ∈Lmax(|ϕℓ(0)|, |ϕℓ(M)|) (the last equality holds because we have assumed that ϕℓ is
affine). That is, ΠtrG , Π
loc
G and Π
fin
G are the largest absolute values of the transition weights,
location weights and final cost functions.
As announced in the first section, the semantics of a PTG G = (LMin, LMax, Lf , Lu,ϕ,∆, π)
is given by a quantitative reachability game
GG =
(
ConfG ,Σ = (R
+ ×∆× R), E, F = (Lf × R
+), p
)
that we describe now. Note that, from now on, we often confuse the PTG G with its
semantics GG , writing, for instance ‘the configurations of G’ instead of: ‘the configurations
of GG ’. We also lift the functions Price, Val, Val and Val, and the notions of plays from GG
to G. A configuration of G is a pair s = (ℓ, ν) ∈ L × R+, where ℓ and ν are respectively
the current location and clock value of G. We denote by ConfG the set of all configurations
of G. Let (ℓ, ν) and (ℓ′, ν ′) be two configurations, let δ = (ℓ, I,R, ℓ′) ∈ ∆ be a transition
of G and t ∈ R+ be a delay. Then, ((ℓ, ν), (t, δ, c), (ℓ′ , ν ′)) ∈ E, iff:
(1) ℓ ∈ Lu implies t = 0 (no time can elapse in urgent locations);
1Here we differ from [15] where Lu ⊆ LMax.
2In our one-clock setting, an affine function is of the form f(ν) = a× ν + b.
3This last restriction is not without loss of generality in the case of PTGs. While all timed automata A
can be turned into an equivalent (with respect to reachability properties) A′ whose clocks are bounded [3],
this technique cannot be applied to PTGs, in particular with arbitrary weights.
4Throughout the paper, we often drop the G in the subscript of several notations when the game is clear
from the context.
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(2) ν + t ∈ I (the guard is satisfied);
(3) R = ⊤ implies ν ′ = 0 (when the clock is reset);
(4) R = ⊥ implies ν ′ = ν + t (when the clock is not reset);
(5) c = π(δ) + t × π(ℓ) (the price of (t, δ) takes into account the weight of ℓ, the delay t
spent in ℓ, and the weight of δ).
In this case, we say that there is a (t, δ)-transition from (ℓ, ν) to (ℓ′, ν ′) with price c, and
we denote this by (ℓ, ν)
t,δ,c
−−→ (ℓ′, ν ′). For two configurations s and s′, we also write s
c
−→
s′ whenever there are t and δ such that s
t,δ,c
−−→ s′. Observe that, since the alphabet of
GG is R
+ × ∆ × R, and its set of configurations is ConfG, plays of G are of the form
ρ = (ℓ1, ν1)
t1,δ1,c1
−−−−→ (ℓ2, ν2) · · · . Finally, the price function p is obtained by summing the
prices of the play (transitions and time spent in the locations) and the final cost function if
applicable. Formally, let ρ = (ℓ1, ν1)
t1,δ1,c1
−−−−→ (ℓ2, ν2) · · · (ℓn, νn) be a finite play s.t., for all
k < n: ℓk /∈ Lf . Then, p(ρ) =
∑n−1
i=1 ci+ϕℓ|ρ|(νn) if ℓn ∈ Lf , and p(ρ) =
∑n−1
i=1 ci otherwise.
As sketched in the introduction, we consider optimal reachability-price games on PTGs,
where the aim of player Min is to reach a location of Lf while minimising the price. Since
the semantics of PTGs is defined in terms of quantitative reachability games, we can apply
Theorem 1, and deduce that all PTGs G are determined. Hence, for all PTGs the value
function Val is well-defined, and we denote it by ValG when we need to emphasise the game
it refers to.
For example, consider the PTG on the left of Figure 1. Using the final cost function ϕ
constantly equal to 0, its value function for location ℓ1 is represented on the right. The
play ρ = (ℓ1, 0)
0,t1,2,0
−−−−→ (ℓ2, 0)
1/4,t2,3,−3.5
−−−−−−−−→ (ℓ3, 1/4)
0,t3,7,6
−−−−→ (ℓ7, 1/4)
3/4,t7,f ,−12
−−−−−−−→ (ℓf , 1)
where tn,m = (ℓn, [0, 1],⊥, ℓm) ends in the unique final location ℓf and its price is p(ρ) =
0− 3.5 + 6− 12 = −9.5.
Let us fix a PTG G with initial configuration c1. We say that a strategy σMin of
Min is optimal if Price(c1, σMin) = ValG(c1), i.e., it ensures Min to enforce the value of
the game, whatever Max does. Similarly, σMin is ε-optimal, for ε > 0, if Price(c1, σMin) 6
ValG(c1)+ε. And, symmetrically, a strategy σMax of Max is optimal (respectively, ε-optimal)
if Price(c1, σMax) = ValG(c1) (respectively, Price(c1, σMax) > ValG(c1) + ε).
3.2. Properties of the value. Let us now discuss useful preliminary properties of the
value functions of PTGs. We have already shown the determinacy of the game, ensuring
the existence of the value function. We will now establish a stronger (and, to the best of
our knowledge, original) result. For all locations ℓ, let ValG(ℓ) denote the function such that
ValG(ℓ)(ν) = ValG(ℓ, ν) for all ν ∈ R
+. Then, we show that, for all ℓ, ValG(ℓ) is a piecewise
continuous function that might exhibit discontinuities only on the borders of the regions of
RegG .
Theorem 2. For all (one-clock) PTGs G, for all r ∈ RegG , for all ℓ ∈ L, ValG(ℓ) is either
infinite or continuous over r.
Proof. In order to show that ValG(ℓ) is continuous over a given region r (for some fixed
location ℓ), we need to show that, for all ν ∈ r, for all ε > 0, there exists δ > 0 s.t. for all
ν ′ with |ν − ν ′| 6 δ, we have |Val(ℓ, ν)− Val(ℓ, ν ′)| 6 ε. To this end, we will show that:
|Val(ℓ, ν)− Val(ℓ, ν ′)| 6 Πloc|ν − ν ′| . (3.1)
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Indeed, assume that this inequality holds, and consider a clock value ν ∈ r and a positive
real number ε. Then, we let δ = ε
Πloc
. In this case, equation (3.1), becomes:
|Val(ℓ, ν)− Val(ℓ, ν ′)| 6 Πloc|ν − ν ′| 6 Πloc
ε
Πloc
6 ε .
Thus, proving equation (3.1) is sufficient to establish continuity. On the other hand,
proving equation (3.1) is equivalent to showing:
Val(ℓ, ν) 6 Val(ℓ, ν ′) + Πloc|ν − ν ′| and Val(ℓ, ν ′) 6 Val(ℓ, ν) + Πloc|ν − ν ′| .
As those two equations are symmetric with respect to ν and ν ′, we only have to show
either of them. We will thus focus on the latter, which, by using the upper value, can
be reformulated as: for all strategies σMin of Min, there exists a strategy σ
′
Min such that
Price((ℓ, ν ′), σ′Min) 6 Price((ℓ, ν), σMin)+Π
loc|ν−ν ′|. Note that this last equation is equivalent
to say that there exists a function g mapping plays ρ′ from (ℓ, ν ′), consistent with σ′Min
(i.e. such that ρ′ = Play((ℓ, ν ′), σ′Min, σMax) for some strategy σMax ofMax) to plays from (ℓ, ν),
consistent with σMin, such that:
Price(ρ′) 6 Price(g(ρ′)) + Πloc|ν − ν ′| .
Thus, our proof strategy will be to show how to build, given a strategy σMin of Min such
a strategy σ′Min and function g. Let r ∈ RegG , ν, ν
′ ∈ r and σMin be a strategy of Min. We
define σ′Min and g by induction on the length of the finite play that is given as argument;
more precisely, we define σ′Min(ρ
′) and g(ρ′) by induction on k, for all plays ρ′ from (ℓ, ν ′),
consistent with σ′Min of length k− 1 and k, respectively. In order to perform this induction,
we need a stronger induction hypothesis, which we give now:
Induction hypothesis: for all plays ρ′ = (ℓ1, ν
′
1)
c′1−→ · · ·
c′
k−1
−−−→ (ℓk, ν
′
k) from (ℓ, ν
′),
consistent with σ′Min, if we let (ℓ1, ν1)
c1−→ · · ·
cℓ−1
−−−→ (ℓℓ, νℓ) = g(ρ
′):
(1) ρ′ and g(ρ′) have the same length, i.e. |ρ| = ℓ = k = |ρ′|,
(2) for every i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, νi and ν
′
i are in the same region, i.e. there exists a region
r′ ∈ RegG such that νi ∈ r
′ and ν ′i ∈ r
′,
(3) |νk − ν
′
k| 6 |ν − ν
′|,
(4) Price(ρ′) 6 Price(g(ρ′)) + Πloc(|ν − ν ′| − |νk − ν
′
k|).
Notice that no property is required on the strategy σ′Min for finite plays that do not start
in (ℓ, ν ′).
As announced, let us now define σ′Min and g, by induction.
Base case k = 0: In this case, σ′Min does not have to be defined. Moreover, in that
case, ρ′ = (ℓ, ν ′) and g(ρ′) = (ℓ, ν). Both plays have length 0, ν and ν ′ are in the same region
by induction hypothesis, and Price(ρ′) = Price(g(ρ′)) = 0, therefore all four properties are
true.
Inductive case: Let us suppose now that the construction is done for a given k > 1,
and perform it for k + 1. We start with the construction of σ′Min. To that extent, consider
a play ρ′ = (ℓ1, ν
′
1)
c′1−→ · · ·
c′
k−1
−−−→ (ℓk, ν
′
k) from (ℓ, ν
′), consistent with σ′Min such that ℓk is a
location of player Min. Let t and δ be the choice of delay and transition made by σMin on
g(ρ′), i.e. σMin(g(ρ
′)) = (t, δ). Then, we define σ′Min(ρ
′) = (t′, δ) where t′ = max(0, νk+t−ν
′
k).
The delay t′ respects the guard of transition δ, as can be seen from Figure 2. Indeed, either
νk + t = ν
′
k + t
′ (cases (a) and (b) in the figure) or νk 6 νk + t 6 ν
′
k, in which case ν
′
k is in
the same region as νk + t since νk and ν
′
k are in the same regionby induction hypothesis.
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•
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(a)
t
t′
νk
•
ν ′k• •
(b)
t
t′
νk
• •
ν ′k
•
(c)
t
t′
Figure 2: The definition of t′ when (a) ν ′k 6 νk, (b) νk < ν
′
k < νk + t, (c) νk < νk + t < ν
′
k.
Let us now build the mapping g. Let ρ′ = (ℓ1, ν
′
1)
c′1−→ · · ·
c′
k−→ (ℓk+1, ν
′
k+1) be a play
from (ℓ, ν ′) consistent with σ′Min and let ρ˜
′ = (ℓ1, ν
′
1)
c′1−→ · · ·
c′
k−1
−−−→ (ℓk, ν
′
k) its prefix of
length k. Let (t′, δ) be the delay and transition taken after ρ˜′. Using the construction of g
over plays of length k by induction, the play g(ρ˜′) = (ℓ1, ν1)
c1−→ · · ·
ck−1
−−−→ (ℓk, νk) (with
(ℓ1, ν1) = (ℓ, ν)) verifies properties (1), (2), (3) and (4). Then:
• if ℓk is a location of Min and σMin(g(ρ˜
′)) = (t, δ), then g(ρ′) = g(ρ˜′)
ck−→ (ℓk+1, νk+1) is
obtained by applying those choices on g(ρ˜′);
• if ℓk is a location of Max, the last clock value νk+1 of g(ρ
′) is rather obtained by choosing
action (t, δ) verifying t = max(0, ν ′k+ t
′−νk). Note that transition δ is allowed since both
νk + t and ν
′
k + t
′ are in the same region (for similar reasons as above).
By induction hypothesis |ρ˜′| = |g(ρ˜′)|, thus: 1 holds, i.e. |ρ′| = |g(ρ′)|. Moreover,
νk+1 and ν
′
k+1 are also in the same region as either they are equal to νk + t and ν
′
k + t
′,
respectively, or δ contains a reset in which case νk+1 = ν
′
k+1 = 0 which proves 2. To
prove 3, notice that we always have either νk + t = ν
′
k + t
′ or νk 6 νk + t 6 ν
′
k = ν
′
k + t
′ or
ν ′k 6 ν
′
k+ t 6 νk = νk+ t. In all of these possibilities, we have |(νk+ t)−(ν
′
k+ t
′)| 6 |νk−ν
′
k|.
We finally check property 4. In both cases:
Price(ρ′) = Price(ρ˜′) + π(δ) + t′π(ℓk)
6 Price(g(ρ˜′)) + Πloc(|ν − ν ′| − |νk − ν
′
k|) + π(δ) + t
′π(ℓk)
= Price(g(ρ′)) + (t′ − t)π(ℓk) + Π
loc(|ν − ν ′| − |νk − ν
′
k|) .
If δ contains no reset, let us prove that
|t′ − t| = |νk − ν
′
k| − |ν
′
k+1 − νk+1| . (3.2)
Indeed, since t′ = ν ′k+1 − ν
′
k and t = νk+1 − νk, we have |t
′ − t| = |ν ′k+1 − ν
′
k − (νk+1 − νk)|.
Then, two cases are possible: either t′ = max(0, νk + t− ν
′
k) or t = max(0, ν
′
k + t
′ − νk). So
we have three different possibilities:
• if t′ + ν ′k = t+ νk, ν
′
k+1 = νk+1, thus |t
′ − t| = |νk − ν
′
k| = |νk − ν
′
k| − |ν
′
k+1 − νk+1|.
• if t = 0, then νk = νk+1 > ν
′
k+1 > ν
′
k, thus |ν
′
k+1 − ν
′
k − (νk+1 − νk)| = ν
′
k+1 − ν
′
k =
(νk − ν
′
k)− (νk − ν
′
k+1) = |νk − ν
′
k| − |ν
′
k+1 − νk+1|.
• if t′ = 0, then ν ′k = ν
′
k+1 > νk+1 > νk, thus |ν
′
k+1 − ν
′
k − (νk+1 − νk)| = νk+1 − νk =
(ν ′k − νk)− (ν
′
k − νk+1) = |νk − ν
′
k| − |ν
′
k+1 − νk+1|.
If δ contains a reset, then ν ′k+1 = νk+1. If t
′ = νk + t− ν
′
k, we have that |t
′ − t| = |νk − ν
′
k|.
Otherwise, either t = 0 and t′ 6 νk − ν
′
k, or t
′ = 0 and t 6 ν ′k − νk.
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ℓ0
5
ℓ2−5
ℓf
ℓ1 5
x = 0
x = 0
y = 1, y := 0
x = 1, x := 0
Figure 3: A PTG with 2 clocks whose value function is not continuous inside a region.
In all cases, we have proved (3.2). Together with the fact that |P (ℓk)| 6 Π
loc, we
conclude that:
Price(ρ′) 6 Price(g(ρ′)) + Πloc(|ν − ν ′| − |νk+1 − ν
′
k+1|) .
Now that σ′Min and g are defined (noticing that g is stable by prefix, we extend naturally
its definition to infinite plays), notice that for all plays ρ′ from (ℓ, ν ′) consistent with σ′Min,
either ρ′ does not reach a final location and its price is +∞, but in this case g(ρ′) has also
price +∞; or ρ′ is finite. In this case, let ν ′k be the clock value of its last configuration,
and νk be the clock value of the last configuration of g(ρ
′). Combining (3) and (4) we have
Price(ρ′) 6 Price(g(ρ′)) + Πloc|ν − ν ′| which concludes the proof.
Remark 1. Let us consider the example in Figure 3 (that we describe informally since
we did not properly define games with multiple clocks), with clocks x and y. One can
easily check that, starting from a configuration (ℓ0, 0, 0.5) in location ℓ0 and where x =
0 and y = 0.5, the following cycle can be taken: (ℓ0, 0, 0.5)
0,δ0,0
−−−→ (ℓ1, 0, 0.5)
0.5,δ1,2.5
−−−−−→
(ℓ2, 0.5, 0)
0.5,δ2,−2.5
−−−−−−−→ (ℓ0, 0, 0.5), where δ0, δ1 and δ2 denote respectively the transitions from
ℓ0 to ℓ1; from ℓ1 to ℓ2; and from ℓ2 to ℓ0. Observe that the price of this cycle is null,
and that no other delays can be played, hence Val(ℓ0, 0, 0.5) = 0. However, starting from
a configuration (ℓ0, 0, 0.6), and following the same path, yields the cycle (ℓ0, 0, 0.6)
0,e0,0
−−−→
(ℓ1, 0, 0.6)
0.4,e1,2
−−−−→ (ℓ2, 0.4, 0)
0.6,e2,−3
−−−−−→ (ℓ0, 0, 0.6) with price−1. Hence, Val(ℓ0, 0, 0.6) = −∞,
and the function is not continuous although both clocks values (0, 0.5) and (0, 0.6) are in
the same region. Observe that this holds even for priced timed automata, since our example
requires only one player.
3.3. Simple priced timed games. As sketched in the introduction, our main contribution
is to solve the special case of simple one-clock priced timed games with arbitrary weights.
Formally, an r-SPTG, with r ∈ Q+ ∩ [0, 1], is a PTG G = (LMin, LMax, Lf , Lu,ϕ,∆, π) such
that for all transitions (ℓ, I,R, ℓ′) ∈ ∆, I = [0, r] (the clock is also bounded by r) and R = ⊥.
Hence, transitions of r-SPTGs are henceforth denoted by (ℓ, ℓ′), dropping the guard and the
reset. Then, an SPTG is a 1-SPTG. This paper is mainly devoted to prove the following
result on SPTGs.
Theorem 3. Let G be an SPTG. Then, for all locations ℓ ∈ L, either Val(ℓ) = +∞, or
Val(ℓ) is continuous and piecewise-affine with at most an exponential number of cutpoints
(in the size of G). The value functions Val(ℓ) for all locations ℓ, as well as a pair of optimal
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ℓ1 ℓ2
ℓf
−W
−1
0
0
0
Figure 4: An SPTG where Min needs memory to play optimally
strategies (σMin, σMax) (that always exist when no values are infinite) can be computed in
exponential time.
3.3.1. Proof strategy. Let us now highlight the main steps that will allow us to establish this
theorem. The central argument consists in showing that all SPTGs admit ‘well-behaved’
optimal strategies for both players, in the sense that these strategies can be finitely described
(and computed in exponential time). To this end, we rely on several new definitions that
we are about to introduce and that we first describe informally.
We start by the case of Max: we will show that Max always has a positional (aka
memoryless) optimal strategy. However, this is not sufficient to show that Max has an
optimal strategy that can be finitely described: indeed, in the case of SPTGs, a positional
strategy associate a move to each configuration of the game, and there are uncountably
many such configurations because of the possible values of the clock. Thus, we introduce
the notion of finite positional strategies (FP-strategies for short). Such strategies partition
the set [0, 1] of possible clock values into finitely many intervals, and ensure that the same
move is played throughout each interval: this move can be either to wait until the clock
reaches the end of the interval, or to take immediately a given transition.
The case of Min is more involved, as shown in the following example taken from [22].
Consider the SPTG of Figure 4, where W is a positive integer, and every location has
weight 0 (thus, it is an untimed game, as originally studied). We claim that the values of
locations ℓ1 and ℓ2 are both −W . Indeed, consider the following strategy for Min: during
each of the firstW visits to ℓ2 (if any), go to ℓ1; else, go to ℓf . Clearly, this strategy ensures
that the final location ℓf will eventually be reached, and that:
(1) either transition (ℓ1, ℓ3) (with weight −W ) will eventually be traversed;
(2) or transition (ℓ1, ℓ2) (with weight −1) will be traversed at least W times.
Hence, in all plays following this strategy, the price will be at most −W . This strategy
allows Min to secure −W , but it cannot ensure a lower price, since Max always has the
opportunity to take the transition (ℓ1, ℓf ) (with price −W ) instead of cycling between ℓ1
and ℓ2. Hence, Max’s optimal choice is to follow the transition (ℓ1, ℓf ) as soon as ℓ1 is
reached, securing a price of −W . The strategy we have just given is optimal for Min, and
there are no optimal memoryless strategies for Min. Indeed, always playing (ℓ2, ℓf ) does not
ensure a price at most −W ; and, always playing (ℓ2, ℓ1) does not guarantee to reach the
target, and this strategy has thus value +∞.
This examples shows the kind of strategies that we will prove sufficient for Min to play
optimally: first play an FP-strategy to obtain play prefix with a sufficiently low price, by
forcing negative cycles (if any); second play another FP-strategy that ensures that the target
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will eventually be reached. Such strategies have been introduced as switching strategies
in [22], and can be finitely described by a pair (σ1Min, σ
2
Min) of FP-strategies and a thresholdK
to trigger the switch when the length of the play prefix drops below K.
Computing the latter of these two strategies is easy: σ2Min is basically an attractor
strategy, which guarantees Min to reach the target (when possible) at a bounded cost.
Thus, the main difficulty in identifying optimal switching strategies is to characterise σ1Min.
To do so, we further introduce the notion of negative cycle strategies (NC-strategies for
short). Those strategies are FP-strategies which guarantee that all cycles taken have cost
of −1 at most, without necessarily guaranteeing to eventually reach the target (as this will
be taken care of by σ2Min). Among those NC-strategies, we identify so-called fake optimal
strategies. Those are the NC-strategies that guarantee Min to obtain the optimal value (or
better) when the target is reached, but do not necessarily guarantee to reach the target
(they are thus not really optimal, hence the name fake-optimal).
Based on these definitions, we will show that all SPTGs with only finite values admit
such optimal switching strategies for Min and optimal FP-strategies for Max. By definition,
these strategies can be finitely described (as a matter of fact, we will show that we can
compute them in exponential time). Let us now give the formal definitions of those notions
3.3.2. Finite positional strategies. We start with the notion of finite positional strategies,
that will formalise a class of optimal strategies for Max:
Definition 3 (FP-strategies). A strategy σ is a finite positional strategy (FP-strategy for
short) iff it is a memoryless strategy (i.e. for all finite plays ρ1 = ρ
′
1
c1−→ s and ρ2 = ρ
′
2
c2−→ s
ending in the same configuration, we have σ(ρ1) = σ(ρ2)) and for all locations ℓ, there exists
a finite sequence of rationals 0 6 νℓ1 < ν
ℓ
2 < · · · < ν
ℓ
k = 1 and a finite sequence of transitions
δ1, . . . , δk ∈ ∆ such that
(1) for all 1 6 i 6 k, for all ν ∈ (νℓi−1, ν
ℓ
i ], either σ(ℓ, ν) = (0, δi), or σ(ℓ, ν) = (ν
ℓ
i − ν, δi)
(assuming νℓ0 = min(0, ν
ℓ
1)); and
(2) if νℓ1 > 0, then σ(ℓ, 0) = (ν
ℓ
1, δ1).
We let pts(σ) be the set of νℓi for all ℓ and i, and int(σ) be the set of all successive
intervals generated by pts(σ). Finally, we let |σ| = |int(σ)| be the size of σ. Intuitively, in
an interval (νℓi−1, ν
ℓ
i ], σ always returns the same move: either to take immediately δi or to
wait until the clock reaches the endpoint νℓi and then take δi.
3.3.3. Switching strategies. On top of the definition of FP-strategies, we can now define the
notion of switching strategy:
Definition 4 (Switching strategies). A switching strategy is described by a pair (σ1Min, σ
2
Min)
of FP-strategies and a switch threshold K. It consists in playing σ1Min until the length of
the play prefix is at least K; and then to switch to strategy σ2Min.
The role of σ2Min is to ensure reaching a final location: it is thus a (classical) attractor
strategy. The role of σ1Min, on the other hand, is to allowMin to decrease the price low enough
(possibly by forcing negative cycles) to secure a price sufficiently low, and the computation
of σ1Min is thus the critical point in the computation of an optimal switching strategy. In
the SPTG of Figure 4, for example, σ1Min is the strategy that goes from ℓ2 to ℓ1, σ
2
Min is the
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strategy going directly to ℓf and the switch occurs after the threshold of K = 2W . The
value of the game under this strategy is thus −W .
3.3.4. Negative cycle strategies. To characterise σ1Min, we introduce now the notion of nega-
tive cycle strategy (NC-strategy):
Definition 5 (Negative cycle strategies). An NC-strategy σMin of Min is an FP-strategy
such that for all runs ρ = (ℓ1, ν)
c1−→ · · ·
ck−1
−−−→ (ℓk, ν
′) ∈ Play(σMin) with ℓ1 = ℓk, and ν, ν
′
in the same interval of int(σMin), the sum of weights of discrete transitions is at most −1,
i.e. π(ℓ1, ℓ2) + · · · + π(ℓk−1, ℓk) 6 −1.
Let us now show that this definition allows one to find an upper bound on the prices
of the runs following such an NC-strategy σMin.
Lemma 4. Let σMin be an NC-strategy, and let ρ ∈ Play(σMin) be a finite play. Then:
Price(ρ) 6 Πloc + (2|σMin| − 1)× |L|Π
tr − (|ρ| − |σMin|)/|L| .
Proof. We start by proving a bound on the price of a finite play ρ˜ ∈ Play(σMin) such that
all clock values are in the same interval I of int(σMin). In this case, we claim that:
Price(ρ˜) 6 |I|Πloc + |L|Πtr − |ρ˜|/|L| . (3.3)
Indeed, the price of ρ˜ is the sum of the weights generated while spending time in locations,
plus the discrete weights of taking transitions. The former is bounded by |I|Πloc since the
total time spent in locations is bounded by |I|. For the discrete weights, one can delete
from ρ˜ at least |ρ˜|/|L| cycles, which have all a weight bounded above by −1, since σMin
is an NC-strategy. After removing those cycles from ρ˜, one ends up with a run of length
at most |L| (otherwise, the same location would be present twice and the remaining run
would still contain a cycle). This ensures that the total price of all transitions is bounded
by |L|Πtr − |ρ˜|/|L|. Hence the bound given above.
Then, we consider the general case of a finite play ρ ∈ Play(σMin) that might cross several
intervals. We achieve this by splitting the play along intervals of int(σMin). Let I1, I2, . . . , Ik
be the intervals of int(σMin) visited during ρ (with k 6 |σMin|). We split ρ into k runs ρ1,
ρ2, . . . , ρk such that ρ = ρ1
c1−→ ρ2
c2−→ · · · ρk; and, for all i, all clock values along ρi are in Ii
(remember that SPTGs contain no reset transitions). Then, we have:
Price(ρ) =
k∑
i=1
Price(ρi) +
k−1∑
i=1
ci . (3.4)
Let us bound these two sums. We start with the rightmost one. Since ci 6 Π
tr for all i,
and since k 6 |σMin|, we have:
k−1∑
i=1
ci 6 (k − 1)Π
tr
6 (|σMin| − 1)Π
tr . (3.5)
Now let us bound the leftmost sum in (3.4). Using (3.3), we obtain:
k∑
i=1
Price(ρi) 6 Π
loc
k∑
i=1
|Ii|+
k∑
i=1
|L|Πtr −
1
|L|
k∑
i=1
|ρi| (3.6)
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Now, we can further bound these three new sums. Indeed, the intervals Ii are consecutive,
hence
∑k
i=1 |Ii| 6 1. Next,
∑k
i=1 |L|Π
tr = k|L|Πtr. But since k 6 |σMin|, we obtain that∑k
i=1 |L|Π
tr 6 |σMin||L|Π
tr. For the last sum, we observe that, by definition of the split of
ρ into ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρk (with k − 1 extra transitions in-between), |ρ| =
∑k
i=1 |ρi| + k, hence∑k
i=1 |ρi| > |ρ| − |σMin|, since |σMin| > k. Plugging these three bounds in (3.6), we obtain:
k∑
i=1
Price(ρi) 6 Π
loc + |σMin||L|Π
tr − (|ρ| − |σMin|)/|L| . (3.7)
Finally, using the bounds (3.5) and (3.7) in (3.4), we obtain:
Price(ρ) 6 (|σMin| − 1)Π
tr +Πloc + |σMin||L|Π
tr − (|ρ| − |σMin|)/|L| ,
hence the Lemma.
3.3.5. Fake-optimal strategies. Next, to characterise the fact that σMin must allow Min to
reach a price which is small enough, without necessarily reaching a target location, we define
the fake value of an NC-strategy σMin from a configuration s as:
fake
σMin
G (s) = sup{Price(ρ) | ρ ∈ Play(s, σMin), ρ reaches a target}
i.e. the value obtained when ignoring the σMin-induced plays that do not reach the target:
we let sup ∅ = −∞. Thus, clearly, fakeσMinG (s) 6 Val
σMin(s). We say that an NC-strategy
σMin is fake-optimal if fake
σMin
G (s) = ValG(s) for all configurations s.
Let us now explain why this notion of fake-optimal strategy is important. As we are
about to show, we can combine any fake-optimal NC-strategy σ1Min with an attractor strategy
σ2Min into a switching strategy σMin, which forces to eventually reach the target with a price
that we can make as small as desired (since σ1Min is an NC-strategy) when (negative) cycles
can be enforced in the game by Min.
Lemma 5. Let G be an SPTG such that ValG(s) 6= +∞, for all s. Let σ
1
Min be an NC-
strategy of Min in G, and σ2Min an attractor strategy. Then, the switching strategy σMin
described by the pair (σ1Min, σ
2
Min) and the switching threshold
K = |L| ×
(
2Πloc + 2|σ1Min| × |L|Π
tr −max(−n, fake
σ1
Min
G (s))
)
+ |σ1Min|
is such that ValσMinG (s) 6 max(−n, fake
σ1
Min
G (s)) for all configurations s.
Remark 2. In particular, if σMin is a fake-optimal NC-strategy, and ValG(s) 6= −∞, for
n > −ValG(s), we obtain a strategy σMin optimal for Min from the configuration s.
Proof of Lemma 5. Let ρ be a play in PlaysG(s, σMin): we show that Price(ρ) 6 max(−n, fake
σ1
Min
G (s)).
This is sufficient for establishing that ValσMinG (s) 6 max(−n, fake
σ1
Min
G (s)). There are two pos-
sibilities regarding ρ ∈ PlaysG(s, σMin), depending on whether the switch has happened or
not:
(1) If ρ reaches the target without switching from σ1Min to σ
2
Min, then ρ ∈ PlaysG(s, σ
1
Min)
and thus Price(ρ) 6 fake
σ1
Min
G (s) 6 max(−n, fake
σ1
Min
G (s)).
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(2) If ρ reaches the target after the switch happened from σ1Min to σ
2
Min, we can decompose
ρ into the concatenation of a prefix ρ1 of length K conforming to σ
1
Min, and a play
prefix ρ2 conforming to σ
2
Min. Thanks to Lemma 4, since ρ1 has length
K = |L| ×
(
Πloc + (2|σ1Min| − 1)× |L|Π
tr − [max(−n, fake
σ1
Min
G (s))−Π
loc − |L|Πtr]
)
+ |σ1Min|
we know that Price(ρ1) 6 max(−n, fake
σ1
Min
G (s)) − Π
loc − |L|Πtr. Moreover, Price(ρ2) 6
Πloc+ |L|Πtr since σ2Min follows an attractor computation and must thus reach the target
in at most |V | transitions (and at most 1 unit of time). Hence,
Price(ρ) = Price(ρ1) + Price(ρ2) 6 max(−n, fake
σ1
Min
G (s))
This result allows us to identify the conditions we need to check to make sure than an
SPTG admits optimal strategies that can be described in a finite way. Formally, we say
that an SPTG is finitely optimal if:
(1) Min has a fake-optimal NC-strategy;
(2) Max has an optimal FP-strategy; and
(3) ValG(ℓ) is a cost function, for all locations ℓ.
The central point in establishing Theorem 3 will thus be to prove that all SPTGs are
finitely optimal, as this guarantees the existence of well-behaved optimal strategies and
value functions. We will also show that these can be computed in exponential time. The
proof is by induction on the number of urgent locations of the SPTG. In Section 4, we
address the base case of SPTGs with urgent locations only (where no time can elapse).
Since these SPTGs are very close to the untimed min-cost reachability games of [22], we
adapt the algorithm in this work and obtain the solveInstant function (Algorithm 1).
This function can also compute ValG(ℓ, 1) for all ℓ and all games G (even with non-urgent
locations) since time cannot elapse anymore when the clock has value 1. Next, using the
continuity result of Theorem 2, we can detect locations ℓ where ValG(ℓ, ν) ∈ {+∞,−∞},
for all ν ∈ [0, 1], and remove them from the game. Finally, in Section 5 we handle SPTGs
with non-urgent locations by refining the technique of [15, 16] (that work only on SPTGs
with non-negative weights).
4. SPTGs with only urgent locations
Throughout this section, we consider an r-SPTG G = (LMin, LMax, Lf , Lu,ϕ,∆, π) where
all non-final locations are urgent, i.e. Lu ∪ Lf = LMin ∪ LMax. Since all locations in G are
urgent, we can ignore from a play ρ = (ℓ0, ν)
c0−→ (ℓ1, ν)
c1−→ · · · the clock values, as well as
weights ci = π(ℓi, ℓi+1), which are now irrelevant. Hence, we denote plays by their sequence
of locations ℓ0ℓ1 · · · . The price of this play is Price(ρ) = +∞ if ℓk 6∈ Lf for all k > 0; and
Price(ρ) =
∑k−1
i=0 π(ℓi, ℓi+1) + ϕℓk(ν) if k is the least position such that ℓk ∈ Lf .
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4.1. Computing the game value for a particular clock value. We first explain how we
can compute the value function of the game for a fixed clock value ν ∈ [0, r]: more precisely,
we will compute the vector (Val(ℓ, ν))ℓ∈L of values for all locations. We will denote by
Valν(ℓ) the value Val(ℓ, ν), so that Valν is the vector we want to compute. Since no time can
elapse, it consists in an adaptation of the techniques developed in [22] to solve (untimed)
min-cost reachability games. The main difference concerns the weights being rational (and
not integers) and the presence of final cost functions.
Following the arguments of [22], we first observe that locations ℓ with values Valν(ℓ) =
+∞ and Valν(ℓ) = −∞ can be pre-computed (using respectively attractor and mean-payoff
techniques) and removed from the game without changing the other values. Then, because
of the particular structure of the game G (where a real price is paid only on the target
location, all other weights being integers), for all plays ρ, Price(ρ) is a value from the set
Zν,ϕ = Z+{ϕℓ(ν) | ℓ ∈ Lf}. We further define Z
+∞
ν,ϕ = Zν,ϕ∪{+∞}. Clearly, Zν,ϕ contains
at most |Lf | values between two consecutive integers, i.e.
∀i ∈ Z |[i, i + 1] ∩ Zν,ϕ| 6 |Lf | (4.1)
Then, we define an operator F : (Z+∞ν,ϕ )
L → (Z+∞ν,ϕ )
L mapping every vector x = (xℓ)ℓ∈L
of (Z+∞ν,ϕ )
L to F(x) = (F(x)ℓ)ℓ∈L defined by
F(x)ℓ =


ϕℓ(ν) if ℓ ∈ Lf
max
(ℓ,ℓ′)∈∆
(
π(ℓ, ℓ′) + xℓ′
)
if ℓ ∈ LMax
min
(ℓ,ℓ′)∈∆
(
π(ℓ, ℓ′) + xℓ′
)
if ℓ ∈ LMin .
We will obtain Valν as the limit of the sequence (x
(i))i>0 defined by x
(0)
ℓ = +∞ if ℓ 6∈ Lf ,
and x
(0)
ℓ = ϕℓ(ν) if ℓ ∈ Lf , and then x
(i) = F(x(i−1)) for i > 0.
The intuition behind this sequence is that x(i) is the value of the game (when the clock
takes value ν) if we impose that Min must reach the target within i steps (and pays a price
of +∞ if it fails to do so). Formally, for a play ρ = ℓ0ℓ1 · · · , we let Price
6i(ρ) = Price(ρ) if
ℓk ∈ Lf for some k 6 i, and Price
6i(ρ) = +∞ otherwise. We further let
Val
6i
ν (ℓ) = infσMin
sup
σMax
Price6i(Play((ℓ, ν), σMax, σMin))
where σMin and σMax are respectively strategies of Min and Max. Lemma 6 of [22] allows us
to easily obtain that:
Lemma 6. For all i > 0, and ℓ ∈ L: x
(i)
ℓ = Val
6i
ν (ℓ).
Sketch of proof. This is proved by induction on i. It is trivial for i = 0, and playing one
more step amounts to computing one more iterate of F .
Now, let us study how the sequence (Val
6i
ν )i>0 behaves and converges to the finite values
of the game. Using again the same arguments as in [22] (in particular, that F is a monotonic
and Scott-continuous operator over the complete lattice (Z+∞ν,ϕ )
L), the sequence (Val
6i
ν )i>0
converges towards the greatest fixed point of F . Let us now show that Valν is actually this
greatest fixed point. First, Corollary 8 of [22] can be adapted to obtain
Lemma 7. For all ℓ ∈ L: Val
6|L|
ν (ℓ) 6 |L|Π
tr +Πfin .
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Algorithm 1: solveInstant(G,ν)
Input: r-SPTG G = (LMin, LMax, Lf , Lu,ϕ,∆, π), a clock value ν ∈ [0, r]
1 foreach ℓ ∈ L do
2 if ℓ ∈ Lf then X(ℓ) := ϕℓ(ν) else X(ℓ) := +∞
3 repeat
4 Xpre := X
5 foreach ℓ ∈ LMax do X(ℓ) := max(ℓ,ℓ′)∈∆
(
π(ℓ, ℓ′) + Xpre(ℓ
′)
)
6 foreach ℓ ∈ LMin do X(ℓ) := min(ℓ,ℓ′)∈∆
(
π(ℓ, ℓ′) + Xpre(ℓ
′)
)
7 foreach ℓ ∈ L such that X(ℓ) < −(|L| − 1)Πtr −Πfin do X(ℓ) := −∞
8 until X = Xpre
9 return X
Proof. Denoting by Attri(S) the i-steps attractor of set S, and assuming that Attr−1(S) = ∅
for all S, we can establish by induction on j that: for all locations ℓ ∈ L with 0 6 k 6 |L|
such that ℓ ∈ Attrk(Lf ) \ Attrk−1(Lf ), and for all 0 6 j 6 |L|:
(1) j < k implies Val
6j
ν (ℓ) = +∞ and
(2) j > k implies Val
6j
ν (ℓ) 6 jΠ
tr +Πfin and Val
6j
ν (ℓ) ∈ Zν,ϕ.
Then, the result is obtained by taking j = |L| in 2.
The next step is to show that the values that can be computed along the sequence (still
assuming that Val(ℓ, ν) is finite for all ℓ) are taken from a finite set:
Lemma 8. For all i > 0 and for all ℓ ∈ L:
Val
6|L|+i
ν (ℓ) ∈ PossValν = [−(|L| − 1)Π
tr −Πfin, |L|Πtr +Πfin] ∩ Zν,ϕ
where PossValν has cardinality bounded by |Lf | ×
(
(2|L| − 1)Πtr + 2Πfin + 1
)
.
Proof. Following the proof of [22, Lemma 9], it is easy to show that if Min can secure, from
some vertex ℓ, a price less than −(|L| − 1)Πtr − Πfin, i.e. Val(ℓ, ν) < −(|L| − 1)Πtr − Πfin,
then it can secure an arbitrarily small price from that configuration, i.e. Val(ℓ, ν) = −∞,
which contradicts our hypothesis that the value is finite.
Hence, for all i > 0, for all ℓ: Val
6i
ν (ℓ) > Val(ℓ, ν) > −(|L| − 1)Π
tr −Πfin. By Lemma 7
and since the sequence is non-increasing, we conclude that, for all i > 0 and for all ℓ ∈ L:
−(|L| − 1)Πtr −Πfin < Val
6|L|+i
ν (ℓ) 6 |L|Π
tr +Πfin .
Since all Val
6|L|+i
ν (ℓ) are also in Zν,ϕ, we conclude that Val
6|L|+i
ν (ℓ) ∈ PossValν for all i > 0.
The upper bound on the size of PossValν is established by (4.1).
This allows us to bound the number of iterations needed for the sequence to stabilise.
The worst case is when all locations are assigned a value bounded below by −(|L|− 1)Πtr−
Πfin from the highest possible values where all vertices are assigned a value bounded above
by |L|Πtr +Πfin, which is itself reached after |L| steps. Hence:
Corollary 9. The sequence (Val
6i
ν )i>0 stabilises after a number of steps at most |Lf | ×
|L| ×
(
(2|L| − 1)Πtr + 2Πfin + 1
)
+ |L|.
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Next, the proofs of [22, Lemma 10 and Corollary 11] allow us to conclude that this
sequence converges towards the value Valν of the game (when all values are finite), which
proves that the value iteration scheme of Algorithm 1 computes exactly Valν for all ν ∈ [0, r].
Indeed, this algorithm also works when some values are not finite. As a corollary, we obtain
a characterisation of the possible values of G:
Corollary 10. For all r-SPTGs G with only urgent locations, locations ℓ ∈ L and values
ν ∈ [0, r], Val(ℓ, ν) is contained in the set PossValν ∪ {−∞,+∞} of cardinal polynomial in
|L|, Πtr, and Πfin, i.e. pseudo-polynomial with respect to the size of G.
Finally, Section 3.4 of [22] explains how to compute simultaneously optimal strategies
for both players. In our context, this allows us to obtain for every clock value ν ∈ [0, r]
and location ℓ of an r-SPTG, such that Val(ℓ, ν) /∈ {−∞,+∞}, an optimal FP-strategy for
Max, and an optimal switching strategy for Min.
4.2. Study of the complete value functions: G is finitely optimal. Now let us explain
how we can reduce the computation of ValG(ℓ) : ν ∈ [0, r] 7→ Val(ℓ, ν) (for all ℓ) to a finite
number of calls to solveInstant (since calling this function for all possible clock value
ν is clearly not feasible). We first study a precise characterisation of these functions, in
particular showing that these are cost functions of CF{[0,r]}.
We first define the set FG of affine functions over [0, r] as follows:
FG = {k + ϕℓ | ℓ ∈ Lf ∧ k ∈ [−(|L| − 1)Π
tr, |L|Πtr] ∩ Z}
Observe that this set is finite and that its cardinality is 2|L|2Πtr, pseudo-polynomial in
the size of G. Moreover, as a direct consequence of Corollary 10, this set contains enough
information to compute the value of the game in each possible value of the clock, in the
following sense:
Lemma 11. For all ℓ ∈ L, for all ν ∈ [0, r]: if Val(ℓ, ν) is finite, then there is f ∈ FG such
that Val(ℓ, ν) = f(ν).
Using the continuity of ValG (Theorem 2), this shows that all the cutpoints of ValG are
intersections of functions from FG , i.e. belong to the set of possible cutpoints
PossCPG = {ν ∈ [0, r] | ∃f1, f2 ∈ FG f1 6= f2 ∧ f1(ν) = f2(ν)} .
This set is depicted in Figure 5 on an example. Observe that PossCPG contains at most
|FG |
2 = 4|Lf |
4(Πtr)2 points (also pseudo-polynomial in the size of G) since all functions
in FG are affine, and can thus intersect at most once with every other function. Moreover,
PossCPG ⊆ Q, since all functions of FG take rational values in 0 and r ∈ Q. Thus, for all ℓ,
ValG(ℓ) is a cost function (with cutpoints in PossCPG and pieces from FG). Since ValG(ℓ) is a
piecewise affine function, we can characterise it completely by computing only its value on
its cutpoints. Hence, we can reconstruct ValG(ℓ) by calling solveInstant on each rational
clock value ν ∈ PossCPG . From the optimal strategies computed along solveInstant, we
can also reconstruct a fake-optimal NC-strategy for Min and an optimal FP-strategy for
Max, hence:
Proposition 12. Every r-SPTG G with only urgent locations is finitely optimal. More-
over, for all locations ℓ, the piecewise affine function ValG(ℓ) has cutpoints in PossCPG of
cardinality 4|Lf |
4(Πtr)2, pseudo-polynomial in the size of G.
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Figure 5: Network of affine functions defined by FG: functions in bold are final affine
functions of G, whereas non-bold ones are their translations with weights k ∈
[−(|L| − 1)Πtr, |L|Πtr] ∩ Z. PossCPG is the set of abscissæ of intersections points,
represented by black disks.
Notice, that this result allows us to compute Val(ℓ) for every ℓ ∈ L. First, we compute
the set PossCPG = {y1, y2, . . . , yℓ}, which can be done in pseudo-polynomial time in the
size of G. Then, for all 1 6 i 6 ℓ, we can compute the vectors
(
Val(ℓ, yi)
)
ℓ∈L
of values in
each location when the clock takes value yi using Algorithm 1. This provides the value of
Val(ℓ) in each cutpoint, for all locations ℓ, which is sufficient to characterise the whole value
function, as it is continuous and piecewise affine. Observe that all cutpoints, and values
at the cutpoints, in the value function are rational numbers, so Algorithm 1 is effective.
Thanks to the above discussions, this procedure consists in a pseudo-polynomial number
of calls to a pseudo-polynomial algorithm, hence, it runs in pseudo-polynomial time. This
allows us to conclude that ValG(ℓ) is a cost function for all ℓ. This proves item 3 of the
definition of finite optimality for r-SPTGs with only urgent locations.
Let us conclude the proof that r-SPTGs with only urgent locations are finitely optimal
by showing that Min has a fake-optimal NC-strategy, and Max has an optimal FP-strategy.
Let ν1, ν2, . . . , νk be the sequence of elements from PossCPG in increasing order, and let us
assume ν0 = 0. For all 0 6 i 6 k, let f
ℓ
i be the function from FG that defines the piece
of ValG(ℓ) in the interval [νi−1, νi] (we have shown above that such an f
ℓ
i always exists).
Formally, for all 0 6 i 6 k, f ℓi ∈ FG verifies Val(ℓ, ν) = f
ℓ
i (ν), for all ν ∈ [ν
ℓ
i−1, ν
ℓ
i ]. Next,
for all 1 6 i 6 k, let µi be a value taken in the middle of [νi−1, νi], i.e. µi =
νi+νi−1
2 . Note
that all µi’s are rational values since all νi’s are. By applying solveInstant in each µi,
we can compute (ValG(ℓ, µi))ℓ∈L, and we can extract an optimal memoryless strategy σ
i
Max
for Max and an optimal switching strategy σiMin for Min. Thus we know that, for all ℓ ∈ L,
playing σiMin (respectively, σ
i
Max) from (ℓ, µi) allows Min (respectively, Max) to ensure a price
at most (respectively, at least) ValG(ℓ, µi) = f
ℓ
i (µi). However, it is easy to check that the
bound given by f ℓi (µi) holds in every clock value, i.e. for all ℓ, for all ν
Price((ℓ, ν), σiMin) 6 f
ℓ
i (ν) and Price((ℓ, ν), σ
i
Max) > f
ℓ
i (ν) .
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This holds because:
(1) Min can play σiMin from all clock values (in [0, r]) since we are considering an r-SPTG;
and
(2) Max does not have more possible strategies from an arbitrary clock value ν ∈ [0, r] than
from µi, because all locations are urgent and time cannot elapse (neither from ν, nor
from µi).
And symmetrically for Max.
We conclude that Min can consistently play the same strategy σiMin from all configu-
rations (ℓ, ν) with ν ∈ [νi−1, νi] and secure a price which is at most f
ℓ
i (ν) = ValG(ℓ, ν),
i.e. σiMin is optimal on this interval. By definition of σ
i
Min, it is easy to extract from it a fake-
optimal NC-strategy (actually, σiMin is a switching strategy described by a pair (σ
1
Min, σ
2
Min),
and σ1Min can be used to obtain the fake-optimal NC-strategy). The same reasoning applies
to strategies of Max and we conclude that Max has an optimal FP-strategy.
5. Finite optimality of general SPTGs
In this section, we consider SPTGs with non-urgent locations. We first prove that all such
SPTGs are finitely optimal. Then, we introduce Algorithm 2 to compute optimal values and
strategies of SPTGs. Throughout the section, we fix an SPTG G = (LMin, LMax, Lf , Lu,ϕ,∆, π)
with non-urgent locations. Before presenting our core contributions, let us explain how we
can detect locations with infinite values. As already argued, we can compute Val(ℓ, 1) for
all ℓ assuming all locations are urgent, since time cannot elapse anymore when the clock
has value 1. This can be done with solveInstant (Algorithm 1). Then, by continuity,
Val(ℓ, 1) = +∞ (respectively, Val(ℓ, 1) = −∞) if and only if Val(ℓ, ν) = +∞ (respectively,
Val(ℓ, ν) = −∞) for all ν ∈ [0, 1]. We remove from the game all locations with infinite
value without changing the values of other locations. Thus, we henceforth assume that
Val(ℓ, ν) ∈ R for all (ℓ, ν).
5.1. The GL′,r construction. To prove finite optimality of SPTGs and to establish correct-
ness of our algorithm, we rely in both cases on a construction that consists in decomposing G
into a sequence of SPTGs with more urgent locations. Intuitively, a game with more urgent
locations is easier to solve since it is closer to an untimed game (in particular, when all lo-
cations are urgent, we can apply the techniques of Section 4). More precisely, given a set L′
of non-urgent locations, and a clock value r0 ∈ [0, 1], we will define a (possibly infinite)
sequence of clock values 1 = r0 > r1 > · · · and a sequence GL′,r0 , GL′,r1 , . . . of SPTGs such
that
(1) all locations of G are also present in each GL′,ri , except that the locations of L
′ are now
urgent; and
(2) for all i > 0, the value function of GL′,ri is equal to ValG on the interval [ri+1, ri]. Hence,
we can re-construct ValG by assembling well-chosen parts of the value functions of the
games GL′,ri (assuming inf i ri = 0).
This basic result will be exploited in two directions. First, we prove by induction on the
number of urgent locations that all SPTGs are finitely optimal, by re-constructing ValG (as
well as optimal strategies) as a ⊲-concatenation of the value functions of a finite sequence
of SPTGs with one more urgent locations. The base case, with only urgent locations, is
solved by Proposition 12. This construction suggests a recursive algorithm in the spirit of
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ValGℓ,r(ℓ, ν)
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•
•
ν1 ν2
ValGℓ,r(ℓ, ν1)
ValGℓ,r(ℓ, ν2)
Figure 6: The condition (5.1) (in the case L′ = ∅ and ℓ ∈ LMin): graphically, it means that
the slope between every two points of the plot in [a, r] (represented with a thick
line) is greater than or equal to −π(ℓ) (represented with dashed line).
[15, 16] (for non-negative weights). Second, we show that this recursion can be avoided (see
Algorithm 2). Instead of turning locations urgent one at a time, this algorithm makes them
all urgent and computes directly the sequence of SPTGs with only urgent locations. Its
proof of correctness relies on the finite optimality of SPTGs and, again, on our basic result
linking the value functions of G and games GL′,ri .
Let us formalise these constructions. Let G be an SPTG, r ∈ [0, 1] be an endpoint, and
x = (xℓ)ℓ∈L be a vector of rational values. Then, wait(G, r,x) is an r-SPTG in which both
players may now decide, in all non-urgent locations ℓ, to wait until the clock takes value r,
and then to stop the game, adding the weight xℓ to the current price of the play. Formally,
wait(G, r,x) = (LMin, LMax, L
′
f , Lu,ϕ
′, T ′, π′) is such that
• L′f = Lf ⊎ {ℓ
f | ℓ ∈ L \ Lu};
• for all ℓ′ ∈ Lf and ν ∈ [0, r], ϕ
′
ℓ′(ν) = ϕℓ′(ν), for all ℓ ∈ L\Lu, ϕ
′
ℓf
(ν) = (r−ν) ·π(ℓ)+xℓ;
• T ′ = T ∪ {(ℓ, [0, r],⊥, ℓf ) | ℓ ∈ L \ Lu};
• for all δ ∈ T ′, π′(δ) = π(δ) if δ ∈ T , and π′(δ) = 0 otherwise.
Then, we let Gr = wait
(
G, r, (ValG(ℓ, r))ℓ∈L
)
, i.e. the game obtained thanks to wait by
letting x be the value of G in r. This first transformation does not alter the value of the
game, for clock values before r:
Lemma 13. For all ν ∈ [0, r] and locations ℓ, ValG(ℓ, ν) = ValGr(ℓ, ν).
Next, we make locations urgent. For a set L′ ⊆ L \ Lu of non-urgent locations, we
let GL′,r be the SPTG obtained from Gr by making urgent every location ℓ of L
′. Observe
that, although all locations ℓ ∈ L′ are now urgent in GL′,r, their clones ℓ
f allow the players
to wait until r. When L′ is a singleton {ℓ}, we write Gℓ,r instead of G{ℓ},r.
While the construction of Gr does not change the value of the game, turning locations
urgent does. Yet, we can characterise an interval [a, r] on which the value functions of H =
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GL′,r and H
+ = GL′∪{ℓ},r coincide, as stated by the next proposition. The interval [a, r]
depends on the slopes of the pieces of ValH+ as depicted in Figure 6: for each location ℓ of
Min, the slopes of the pieces of ValH+ contained in [a, r] should be 6 −π(ℓ) (and > −π(ℓ)
when ℓ belongs to Max). It is proved by lifting optimal strategies of H+ into H, and strongly
relies on the determinacy result of Theorem 1. Hereafter, we denote the slope of ValG(ℓ)
in-between ν and ν ′ by slopeℓG(ν, ν
′), formally defined by slopeℓG(ν, ν
′) = ValG(ℓ,ν
′)−ValG(ℓ,ν)
ν′−ν .
Proposition 14. Let 0 6 a < r 6 1, L′ ⊆ L\Lu and ℓ /∈ L
′∪Lu a non-urgent location ofMin
(respectively, Max). Assume that GL′∪{ℓ},r is finitely optimal, and for all a 6 ν1 < ν2 6 r
slopeℓGL′∪{ℓ},r(ν1, ν2) > −π(ℓ) (respectively, 6 −π(ℓ)) . (5.1)
Then, for all ν ∈ [a, r] and ℓ′ ∈ L, ValGL′∪{ℓ},r(ℓ
′, ν) = ValGL′,r(ℓ
′, ν). Furthermore, fake-
optimal NC-strategies and optimal FP-strategies in GL′∪{ℓ},r are also fake-optimal and op-
timal over [a, r] in GL′,r.
Before proving this result, we start with an auxiliary lemma showing a property of the
rates of change of the value functions associated to non-urgent locations
Lemma 15. Let G be an r-SPTG, ℓ and ℓ′ be non-urgent locations of Min and Max,
respectively. Then for all 0 6 ν < ν ′ 6 r:
slopeℓG(ν, ν
′) > −π(ℓ) and slopeℓG(ν, ν
′) 6 −π(ℓ′) .
Proof. For the location ℓ, the inequality rewrites in
ValG(ℓ, ν) 6 (ν
′ − ν)π(ℓ) + ValG(ℓ, ν
′) .
Using the upper definition of the value (thanks to the determinacy result of Theorem 1),
it suffices to prove, for all ε > 0, the existence of a strategy σMin of Min such that for all
strategies σMax of Max:
Price(Play((ℓ, ν), σMin, σMax)) 6 (ν
′ − ν)π(ℓ) + ValG(ℓ, ν
′) + ε . (5.2)
To prove the existence of such a σMin, we first observe that the definition of the value implies
the existence of a strategy σ′Min such that for all strategies σMax:
Price(Play((ℓ, ν ′), σ′Min, σMax)) 6 ValG(ℓ, ν
′) + ε .
Then, σMin can be obtained as follows. Under σMin, Min will all always play as indicated by
σ′Min, except in the first round. In this first round, the game is still in ℓ and Min will play
like σ′Min, adding an extra delay of ν
′ − ν time units (observe Min is allowed to do so, since
ℓ is non-urgent). Clearly, this extra delay in ℓ will incur a cost of (ν ′ − ν)π(ℓ), hence, we
obtain (5.2).
A similar reasoning allows us to obtain the result for ℓ′.
Now, we show that, even if the locations in L′ are turned into urgent locations, we may
still obtain for them a similar result of the rates of change as the one of Lemma 15:
Lemma 16. For all locations ℓ ∈ L′ ∩ LMin (respectively, ℓ ∈ L
′ ∩ LMax), and ν ∈ [0, r],
ValGL′,r(ℓ, ν) 6 (r−ν)π(ℓ)+ValG(ℓ, r) (respectively, ValGL′,r(ℓ, ν) > (r−ν)π(ℓ)+ValG(ℓ, r) ).
Proof. It suffices to notice that from (ℓ, ν), Min (respectively, Max) may choose to go directly
in ℓf ensuring the value (r − ν)π(ℓ) + ValG(ℓ, r).
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We are now ready to establish Proposition 14:
Proof of Proposition 14. Let σMin and σMax be respectively a fake-optimal NC-strategy of
Min and an optimal FP-strategy of Max in GL′∪{ℓ},r. Notice that both strategies are also
well-defined finite positional strategies in GL′,r.
First, let us show that σMin is indeed an NC-strategy in GL′,r. Take a finite play
(ℓ0, ν0)
c0−→ · · ·
ck−1
−−−→ (ℓk, νk), of length k > 2, that conforms with σMin in GL′,r, and with
ℓ0 = ℓk and ν0, νk in the same interval I of int(σMin). To show that σMin is an NC-strategy,
we need to show that the price of this play is at most -1. For every ℓi that is in LMin, and
ν ∈ I, σMin(ℓi, ν) must have a 0 delay, otherwise νk would not be in the same interval as ν0.
Thus, the play (ℓ0, ν0)
c′0−→ · · ·
c′
k−1
−−−→ (ℓk, ν0) also conforms with σMin (with possibly different
weights). Furthermore, as all the delays are 0 we are sure that this play is also a valid play
in GL′∪{ℓ},r, in which σMin is an NC-strategy. Therefore, π(ℓ0, ℓ1) + · · · + π(ℓk−1, ℓk) 6 −1,
and σMin is an NC-strategy in GL′,r.
We now show the result for ℓ ∈ LMin. The proof for ℓ ∈ LMax is a straightforward
adaptation. Notice that every play in GL′,r that conforms with σMin is also a play in
GL′∪{ℓ},r that conforms with σMin, as σMin is defined in GL′∪{ℓ},r and thus plays with no
delay in location ℓ. Thus, for all ν ∈ [a, r] and ℓ′ ∈ L, by Lemma 5,
ValGL′,r(ℓ
′, ν) 6 fakeσMinGL′,r
(ℓ′, ν) = fakeσMinGL′∪{ℓ},r
(ℓ′, ν) = ValGL′∪{ℓ},r(ℓ
′, ν) . (5.3)
To obtain that ValGL′,r(ℓ
′, ν) = ValGL′∪{ℓ},r(ℓ
′, ν), it remains to show the reverse inequal-
ity. To that extent, let ρ be a finite play in GL′,r that conforms with σMax, starts in a
configuration (ℓ′, ν) with ν ∈ [a, r], and ends in a final location. We show by induction on
the length of ρ that Price(ρ) > ValGL′∪{ℓ},r(ℓ
′, ν). If ρ has size 1 then ℓ′ is a final configuration
and Price(ρ) = ValGL′∪{ℓ},r(ℓ
′, ν) = ϕ′ℓ′(ν).
Otherwise ρ = (ℓ′, ν)
c
−→ ρ′ where ρ′ is a run that conforms with σMax, starting in
a configuration (ℓ′′, ν ′′) and ending in a final configuration. By induction hypothesis, we
have Price(ρ′) > ValGL′∪{ℓ},r(ℓ
′′, ν ′′). We now distinguish three cases, the two first being
immediate:
• If ℓ′ ∈ LMax, then σMax(ℓ
′, ν) leads to the next configuration (ℓ′′, ν ′′), thus
ValGL′∪{ℓ},r(ℓ
′, ν) = PriceGL′∪{ℓ},r((ℓ
′, ν), σMax)
= c+ PriceGL′∪{ℓ},r((ℓ
′′, ν ′′), σMax)
6 c+ Price(ρ′) = Price(ρ) .
• If ℓ′ ∈ LMin, and ℓ
′ 6= ℓ or ν ′′ = ν, we have that (ℓ′, ν)
c
−→ (ℓ′′, ν ′′) is a valid transition in G′.
Therefore, ValGL′∪{ℓ},r(ℓ
′, ν) 6 c+ ValGL′∪{ℓ},r(ℓ
′′, ν ′′), hence
Price(ρ) = c+ Price(ρ′) > c+ ValGL′∪{ℓ},r(ℓ
′′, ν ′′) > ValGL′∪{ℓ},r(ℓ
′, ν).
• Finally, if ℓ′ = ℓ and ν ′′ > ν, then c = (ν ′′ − ν)π(ℓ) + π(ℓ, ℓ′′). As (ℓ, ν ′′)
π(ℓ,ℓ′′)
−−−−→ (ℓ′′, ν ′′)
is a valid transition in GL′∪{ℓ},r, we have ValGL′∪{ℓ},r(ℓ, ν
′′) 6 π(ℓ, ℓ′′) + ValGL′∪{ℓ},r(ℓ
′′, ν ′′).
Furthermore, since ν ′′ ∈ [a, r], we can use (5.1) to obtain
ValGL′∪{ℓ},r(ℓ, ν) 6 ValGL′∪{ℓ},r(ℓ, ν
′′) + (ν ′′ − ν)π(ℓ)
6 ValGL′∪{ℓ},r(ℓ
′′, ν ′′) + π(ℓ, ℓ′′) + (ν ′′ − ν)π(ℓ) .
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Therefore
Price(ρ) = (ν ′′ − ν)π(ℓ) + π(ℓ, ℓ′′) + Price(ρ′)
> (ν ′′ − ν)π(ℓ) + π(ℓ, ℓ′′) + ValGL′∪{ℓ},r(ℓ
′′, ν ′′) > ValGL′∪{ℓ},r(ℓ
′, ν) .
This concludes the induction. As a consequence,
inf
σ′
Min
∈StratMin(GL′,r)
PriceGL′,r(Play((ℓ
′, ν), σ′Min, σMax)) > ValGL′∪{ℓ},r(ℓ
′, ν)
for all locations ℓ′ and ν ∈ [a, r], which finally proves that ValGL′,r(ℓ
′, ν) > ValGL′∪{ℓ},r(ℓ
′, ν).
Fake-optimality of σMin over [a, r] in GL′∪{ℓ},r is then obtained by (5.3).
Given an SPTG G and some finitely optimal GL′,r, we now characterise precisely the
left endpoint of the maximal interval ending in r where the value functions of G and GL′,r
coincide, with the operator leftL′ : (0, 1] → [0, 1] (or simply left, if L
′ is clear) defined as:
leftL′(r) = inf{r
′
6 r | ∀ℓ ∈ L ∀ν ∈ [r′, r] ValGL′,r(ℓ, ν) = ValG(ℓ, ν)} .
By continuity of the value (Theorem 2), this infimum exists and ValG(ℓ, leftL′(r)) = ValGL′,r(ℓ, leftL′(r)).
Moreover, ValG(ℓ) is a cost function on [left(r), r], since GL′,r is finitely optimal. However,
this definition of left(r) is semantical. Yet, building on the ideas of Proposition 14, we can
effectively compute left(r), given ValGL′,r . We claim that leftL′(r) is the minimal clock value
such that for all locations ℓ ∈ L′∩LMin (respectively, ℓ ∈ L
′∩LMax), the slopes of the affine
sections of the cost function ValGL′,r(ℓ) on [left(r), r] are at least (at most) −π(ℓ). Hence,
left(r) can be obtained (see Figure 7) by inspecting iteratively, for all ℓ of Min (respectively,
Max), the slopes of ValGL′,r(ℓ) by decreasing clock values until we find a piece with a slope
greater than −π(ℓ) (respectively, smaller than −π(ℓ)). This enumeration of the slopes is
effective as ValGL′,r has finitely many pieces, by hypothesis. Moreover, this guarantees that
left(r) < r, as shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 17. Let G be an SPTG, L′ ⊆ L\Lu, and r ∈ (0, 1], such that GL′′,r is finitely optimal
for all L′′ ⊆ L′. Then, leftL′(r) is the minimal clock value such that for all locations ℓ ∈
L′ ∩ LMin (respectively, ℓ ∈ L
′ ∩ LMax), the slopes of the affine sections of the cost function
ValGL′,r(ℓ) on [left(r), r] are at least (respectively, at most) −π(ℓ). Moreover, left(r) < r.
Proof. Since ValGL′,r(ℓ) = ValG(ℓ) on [left(r), r], and as ℓ is non-urgent in G, Lemma 15
states that all the slopes of ValG(ℓ) are at least (respectively, at most) −π(ℓ) on [left(r), r].
We now show the minimality property by contradiction. Therefore, let r′ < left(r) such
that all cost functions ValGL′,r(ℓ) are affine on [r
′, left(r)], and assume that for all ℓ ∈ L′∩LMin
(respectively, ℓ ∈ L′∩LMax), the slopes of ValGL′,r(ℓ) on [r
′, left(r)] are at least (respectively,
at most) −π(ℓ). Hence, this property holds on [r′, r]. Then, by applying Proposition 14
|L′| times (here, we use the finite optimality of the games GL′′,r with L
′′ ⊆ L′), we have
that for all ν ∈ [r′, r] ValGr(ℓ, ν) = ValGL′,r(ℓ, ν). Using Lemma 13, we also know that for
all ν 6 r, and ℓ, ValGr(ℓ, ν) = ValG(ℓ, ν). Thus, ValGr,L′ (ℓ, ν) = ValG(ℓ, ν). As r
′ < left(r),
this contradicts the definition of leftL′(r).
We finally prove that left(r) < r. This is immediate in case left(r) = 0, since r > 0.
Otherwise, from the result obtained previously, we know that there exists r′ < left(r), and
ℓ⋆ ∈ L′ such that ValGL′,r(ℓ
⋆) is affine on [r′, left(r)] of slope smaller (respectively, greater)
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ValGℓ⋆,r(ℓ
⋆, ν)
ν
ValG(ℓ
⋆, r)
left(r) r
Figure 7: In this example L′ = {ℓ⋆} and ℓ⋆ ∈ LMin. left(r) is the leftmost point such
that all slopes on its right are smaller than or equal to −π(ℓ⋆) in the graph of
ValGℓ⋆,r(ℓ
⋆, ν). Dashed lines have slope −π(ℓ⋆).
than −π(ℓ⋆) if ℓ⋆ ∈ LMin (respectively, ℓ
⋆ ∈ LMax), i.e.{
ValGL′,r(ℓ
⋆, r′) > ValGL′,r(ℓ
⋆, left(r)) + (left(r)− r′)π(ℓ⋆) if ℓ⋆ ∈ LMin
ValGL′,r(ℓ
⋆, r′) < ValGL′,r(ℓ
⋆, left(r)) + (left(r)− r′)π(ℓ⋆) if ℓ⋆ ∈ LMax .
From Lemma 16, we also know that{
ValGL′,r(ℓ
⋆, r′) 6 ValGL′,r(ℓ
⋆, r) + (r − r′)π(ℓ⋆) if ℓ⋆ ∈ LMin
ValGL′,r(ℓ
⋆, r′) > ValGL′,r(ℓ
⋆, r) + (r − r′)π(ℓ⋆) if ℓ⋆ ∈ LMax .
Both equations combined imply{
ValGL′,r(ℓ
⋆, r) > ValGL′,r(ℓ
⋆, left(r)) + (left(r)− r)π(ℓ⋆) if ℓ⋆ ∈ LMin
ValGL′,r(ℓ
⋆, r) < ValGL′,r(ℓ
⋆, left(r)) + (left(r)− r)π(ℓ⋆) if ℓ⋆ ∈ LMax
which is not possible if left(r) = r.
Thus, one can reconstruct ValG on [inf i ri, r0] from the value functions of the (potentially
infinite) sequence of games GL′,r0 , GL′,r1 , . . . where ri+1 = left(ri) for all i such that ri > 0,
for all possible choices of non-urgent locations L′. Next, we will define two different ways
of choosing L′: the former to prove finite optimality of all SPTGs, the latter to obtain an
algorithm to solve them.
5.2. SPTGs are finitely optimal. To prove finite optimality of all SPTGs we reason by
induction on the number of non-urgent locations and instantiate the previous results to
the case where L′ = {ℓ⋆} where ℓ⋆ is a non-urgent location of minimum weight (i.e. for all
ℓ ∈ L, π(ℓ⋆) 6 π(ℓ)). Given r0 ∈ [0, 1], we let r0 > r1 > · · · be the decreasing sequence of
clock values such that ri = leftℓ⋆(ri−1) for all i > 0. As explained before, we will build ValG
on [inf i ri, r0] from the value functions of games Gℓ⋆,ri . Assuming finite optimality of those
games, this will prove that G is finitely optimal under the condition that r0 > r1 > · · ·
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eventually stops, i.e. ri = 0 for some i. Lemma 19 will prove this property. First, we relate
the optimal value functions with the final cost functions.
Lemma 18. Assume that Gℓ⋆,r is finitely optimal. If ValGℓ⋆,r(ℓ
⋆) is affine on a non-singleton
interval I ⊆ [0, r] with a slope greater5 than −π(ℓ⋆), then there exists f ∈ FG (see definition
in page 20) such that for all ν ∈ I, ValGℓ⋆,r(ℓ
⋆, ν) = f(ν).
Proof. Let σ1Min and σMax be some fake-optimal NC-strategy and optimal FP-strategy in Gℓ⋆,r.
As I is a non-singleton interval, there exists a subinterval I ′ ⊂ I, which is not a singleton
and is contained in an interval of σ1Min and of σMax. Let σMin be the switching strategy
obtained from σ1Min in Lemma 5: notice that both strategies have the same intervals.
Let ν ∈ I ′. Since ValGℓ⋆,r(ℓ
⋆, ν) /∈ {+∞,−∞}, the play Play((ℓ⋆, ν), σMin, σMax) neces-
sarily reaches a final location and has price ValGℓ⋆,r(ℓ
⋆, ν). Let (ℓ0, ν0)
c0−→ · · · (ℓk, νk) be its
prefix until the first final location ℓk (the prefix used to compute the price of the play). We
also let ν ′ ∈ I ′ be a clock value such that ν < ν ′.
Assume by contradiction that there exists an index i such that ν < νi and let i be the
smallest of such indices. For each j < i, if ℓj ∈ LMin, let (t, δ) = σMin(ℓj , ν) and (t
′, δ′) =
σMin(ℓj , ν
′). Similarly, if ℓj ∈ LMax, we let (t, δ) = σMax(ℓj , ν) and (t
′, δ′) = σMax(ℓj , ν
′). As
I ′ is contained in an interval of σMin and σMax, we have δ = δ
′ and either t = t′ = 0, or
ν+ t = ν ′+ t′. Applying this result for all j < i, we obtain that (ℓ0, ν
′)
c′0−→ · · · (ℓi−1, ν
′)
c′i−1
−−→
(ℓi, νi)
ci−→ · · · (ℓk, νk) is a prefix of Play((ℓ
⋆, ν ′), σMin, σMax): notice moreover that, as before,
this prefix has price ValGℓ⋆,r(ℓ
⋆, ν ′). In particular,
ValGℓ⋆,r(ℓ
⋆, ν ′) = ValGℓ⋆,r(ℓ
⋆, ν)− (ν ′ − ν)π(ℓi−1) 6 ValGℓ⋆,r(ℓ
⋆, ν)− (ν ′ − ν)π(ℓ⋆)
which implies that the slope of ValGℓ⋆,r(ℓ
⋆) is at most −π(ℓ⋆), and therefore contradicts the
hypothesis. As a consequence, we have that νi = ν for all i.
Again by contradiction, assume now that ℓk = ℓ
f for some ℓ ∈ L \ Lu. By the same
reasoning as before, we then would have ValGℓ⋆,r(ℓ
⋆, ν ′) = ValGℓ⋆,r(ℓ
⋆, ν)−(ν ′−ν)π(ℓ), which
again contradicts the hypothesis.
Therefore, ℓk ∈ Lf . Suppose, for a contradiction, that the prefix (ℓ0, ν)
c0−→ · · · (ℓk, ν)
contains a cycle. Since σMin is a switching strategy and σMax is a memoryless strategy, this
implies that the cycle is contained in the part of σMin where the decision is taken by the
strategy σ1Min: since it is an NC-strategy, this implies that the sum of the weights along the
cycle is at most −1. But if this is the case, we may modify the switching strategy σMin to
loop more in the same cycle (this is indeed a cycle in the timed game, not only in the untimed
region game): against the optimal memoryless strategy σMax, this would imply that Min has
a sequence of strategies to obtain a value as small as it wants, and thus ValGℓ⋆,r(ℓ
⋆, ν) = −∞.
This contradicts the absence of values −∞ in the game. Thus, the prefix (ℓ0, ν)
c0−→ · · · (ℓk, ν)
contains no cycles. Thus, the sum of the discrete weights w = π(ℓ0, ℓ1) + · · · + π(ℓk−1, ℓk)
belongs to the set [−(|L|−1)Πtr, |L|Πtr]∩Z, and we have ValGℓ⋆,r(ℓ
⋆, ν) = w+ϕℓk(ν). Notice
that the previous developments also show that for all ν ′ ∈ I ′ (here, ν < ν ′ is not needed),
ValGℓ⋆,r(ℓ
⋆, ν ′) = w + ϕℓk(ν
′), with the same location ℓk, and weight k. Since this equality
holds on I ′ ⊆ I which is not a singleton, and ValGℓ⋆,r(ℓ
⋆) is affine on I, it holds everywhere
on I. This shows the result since w + ϕℓk ∈ FG.
5For this result, the order does not depend on the owner of the location, but on the fact that ℓ⋆ has
minimal weight amongst locations of G.
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We now prove the termination of the sequence of ri’s described earlier. This is achieved
by showing why, for all i, the owner of ℓ⋆ has a strictly better strategy in configura-
tion (ℓ⋆, ri+1) than waiting until ri in location ℓ
⋆.
Lemma 19. If Gℓ⋆,ri is finitely optimal for all i > 0, then
(1) if ℓ⋆ ∈ LMin (respectively, LMax), ValG(ℓ
⋆, ri+1) < ValG(ℓ
⋆, ri) + (ri − ri+1)π(ℓ
⋆) (respec-
tively, ValG(ℓ
⋆, ri+1) > ValG(ℓ
⋆, ri) + (ri − ri+1)π(ℓ
⋆)), for all i; and
(2) there is i 6 |FG |
2 + 2 such that ri = 0.
Proof. For the first item, we assume ℓ⋆ ∈ LMin, since the proof of the other case only
differ with respect to the sense of the inequalities. From Lemma 17, we know that in Gℓ⋆,ri
there exists r′ < ri+1 such that ValGℓ⋆,ri (ℓ
⋆) is affine on [r′, ri+1] and its slope is smaller
than −π(ℓ⋆), i.e. ValGℓ⋆,ri (ℓ
⋆, ri+1) < ValGℓ⋆,ri (r
′)− (ri+1 − r
′)π(ℓ⋆). Lemma 16 also ensures
that ValGℓ⋆,ri (ℓ
⋆, r′) 6 ValG(ℓ
⋆, ri)+ (ri− r
′)π(ℓ⋆). Combining both inequalities allows us to
conclude.
We now turn to the proof of the second item, showing the stationarity of sequence (ri)i>0.
We consider first the case where ℓ⋆ ∈ LMax. Let i > 0 such that ri 6= 0 (if there exist no
such i then r1 = 0). Recall from Lemma 17 that there exists r
′
i < ri such that ValGℓ⋆,ri−1 (ℓ
⋆)
is affine on [r′i, ri], of slope greater than −π(ℓ
⋆). In particular,
ValGℓ⋆,ri−1
(ℓ⋆, ri)− ValGℓ⋆,ri−1 (ℓ
⋆, r′i)
ri − r′i
> −π(ℓ⋆) .
Lemma 18 states that on [r′i, ri], ValGℓ⋆,ri−1 (ℓ
⋆) is equal to some fi ∈ FG . As fi is an affine
function, fi(ri) = ValGℓ⋆,ri−1 (ℓ
⋆, ri), and fi(r
′
i) = ValGℓ⋆,ri−1 (ℓ
⋆, r′i). Thus, for all ν,
fi(ν) = ValGℓ⋆,ri−1 (ℓ
⋆, ri) +
ValGℓ⋆,ri−1
(ℓ⋆, r′i)− ValGℓ⋆,ri−1 (ℓ
⋆, ri)
ri − r′i
(ri − ν).
Since Gℓ⋆,ri−1 is assumed to be finitely optimal, we know that ValGℓ⋆,ri−1 (ℓ
⋆, ri) = ValG(ℓ
⋆, ri),
by definition of ri = leftℓ⋆(ri−1). Therefore, combining both equalities above, for all clock
values ν < ri, we have fi(ν) < ValG(ℓ
⋆, ri) + π(ℓ
⋆)(ri − ν).
Consider then j > i such that rj 6= 0. We claim that fj 6= fi. Indeed, we have
ValG(ℓ
⋆, rj) = fj(rj). As, in G, ℓ
⋆ is a non-urgent location, Lemma 15 ensures that
ValG(ℓ
⋆, rj) > ValG(ℓ
⋆, ri) + π(ℓ
⋆)(ri − rj) .
As for all i′, ValG(ℓ
⋆, ri′) = fi′(ri′), the equality above is equivalent to fj(rj) > fi(ri) +
π(ℓ⋆)(ri − rj). Recall that fi has a slope strictly greater that −π(ℓ
⋆), therefore fi(rj) <
fi(ri) + π(ℓ
⋆)(ri − rj) 6 fj(rj). As a consequence fi 6= fj (this is depicted in Figure 8).
Therefore, there cannot be more than |FG| + 1 non-null elements in the sequence r0 >
r1 > · · · , which proves that there exists i 6 |FG |+ 2 such that ri = 0.
We continue with the case where ℓ⋆ ∈ LMin. Let r∞ = inf{ri | i > 0}. In this case,
we look at the affine parts of ValG(ℓ
⋆) with a slope greater than −π(ℓ⋆), and we show that
there can only be finitely many such segments in [r∞, 1]. We then show that there is at
least one such segment contained in [ri+1, ri] for all i, bounding the size of the sequence.
In the following, we call segment every interval [a, b] ⊂ (r∞, 1] such that a and b are
two consecutive cutpoints of the cost function ValG(ℓ
⋆) over (r∞, 1]. Recall that it means
that ValG(ℓ
⋆) is affine on [a, b], and if we let a′ be the greatest cutpoint smaller than a,
and b′ be the smallest cutpoint greater than b, the slopes of ValG(ℓ
⋆) on [a′, a] and [b, b′]
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ValG(ℓ
⋆, ν)
ν
−π(ℓ⋆)
fi
fj
rj ri
Figure 8: The case ℓ⋆ ∈ LMax: a geometric proof of fi 6= fj. The dotted lines represents fi
and fj, the dashed lines have slope −π(ℓ
⋆), and the plain line depicts ValG(ℓ
⋆).
Because the slope of fi is strictly smaller than −π(ℓ
⋆), and the value at rj is above
the dashed line it cannot be the case that fi(rj) = ValG(ℓ
⋆, rj) = fj(rj).
are different from the slope on [a, b]. We abuse the notations by referring to the slope of
a segment [a, b] for the slope of ValG(ℓ
⋆) on [a, b] and simply call cutpoint a cutpoint of
ValG(ℓ
⋆).
To every segment [a, b] with a slope greater than −π(ℓ⋆), we associate a function f[a,b] ∈
FG as follows. Let i be the smallest index such that [a, b] ∩ [ri+1, ri] is a non singleton
interval [a′, b′]. Lemma 18 ensures that there exists f[a,b] ∈ FG such that for all ν ∈ [a
′, b′],
ValG(ℓ
⋆, ν) = f[a,b](ν).
Consider now two disjoint segments [a, b] and [c, d] with a slope greater than −π(ℓ⋆),
and assume that f[a,b] = f[c,d] (in particular both segments have the same slope). Without
loss of generality, assume that b < c. We claim that there exists a segment [e, g] in-between
[a, b] and [c, d] with a slope greater than the slope of [c, d], and that f[e,g] and f[a,b] intersect
over x ∈ [b, c], i.e. f[e,g](x) = f[a,b](x) (depicted in Figure 9). We prove it now.
Let α be the greatest cutpoint smaller than c. We know that the slope of [α, c] is different
from the one of [c, d]. If it is greater then define e = α and x = g = c, those indeed satisfy
the property. If the slope of [α, c] is smaller than the one of [c, d], then for all ν ∈ [α, c),
ValG(ℓ
⋆, ν) > f[c,d](ν). Let x be the greatest point in [b, α] such that ValG(ℓ
⋆, x) = f[c,d](x).
We know that it exists since ValG(ℓ
⋆, b) = f[c,d](b), and ValG(ℓ
⋆) is continuous. Observe
that ValG(ℓ
⋆, ν) > f[c,d](ν), for all x < ν < c. Finally, let g be the smallest cutpoint of
ValG(ℓ
⋆) strictly greater than x, and e the greatest cutpoint of ValG(ℓ
⋆) smaller than or
equal to x. By construction, [e, g] is a segment that contains x. The slope of the segment
[e, g] is s[e,g] =
ValG(ℓ
⋆,g)−ValG(ℓ
⋆,x)
g−x , and the slope of the segment [c, d] is equal to s[c,d] =
f[c,d](g)−f[c,d](x)
g−x . Remembering that ValG(ℓ
⋆, x) = f[c,d](x), and that ValG(ℓ
⋆, g) > f[c,d](g)
since g ∈ (x, c), we obtain that s[e,g] > s[c,d]. Finally, since ValG(ℓ
⋆, x) = f[c,d](x) = f[e,g](x),
x is indeed the intersection point of f[c,d] = f[a,b] and f[e,g], which concludes the proof of the
previous claim.
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Figure 9: In order for the segments [a, b] and [c, d] to be aligned, there must exist a segment
with a biggest slope crossing f[a,b] (represented by a dashed line) between b and
c.
For every function f ∈ FG , there are less than |FG | intersection points between f and the
other functions of FG (at most one for each pair (f, f
′)). If f has a slope greater than −π(ℓ⋆),
thanks to the previous paragraph, we know that there are at most |FG | segments [a, b] such
that f[a,b] = f . Summing over all possible functions f , there are at most |FG|
2 segments
with a slope greater than −π(ℓ⋆).
Now, we link those segments with the clock values ri’s, for i > 0. By item 1, thanks to
the finite-optimality of Gℓ⋆,ri , ValG(ℓ
⋆, ri+1) < (ri − ri+1)π(ℓ
⋆) + ValG(ℓ
⋆, ri). Furthermore,
Proposition 21 states that the slope of the segment directly on the left of ri is equal to −π(ℓ
⋆).
With the previous inequality in mind, this cannot be the case if ValG(ℓ
⋆) is affine over
the whole interval [ri+1, ri]. Thus, there exists a segment [a, b] of slope strictly greater
than −π(ℓ⋆) such that b ∈ [ri+1, ri]. As we also know that the slope left to ri+1 is −π(ℓ
⋆),
it must be the case that a ∈ [ri+1, ri]. Hence, we have shown that in-between ri+1 and ri,
there is always a segment (this is depicted in Figure 10). As the number of such segments
is bounded by |FG |
2, we know that the sequence ri is stationary in at most |FG |
2 + 1 steps,
i.e. that there exists i 6 |FG|
2 + 1 such that ri = 0.
By iterating this construction, we make all locations urgent iteratively, and obtain:
Theorem 20. Every SPTG G is finitely optimal and for all locations ℓ, ValG(ℓ) has at most
O
(
(Πtr|L|2)2|L|+2
)
cutpoints.
Proof. As announced, we show by induction on n > 0 that every r-SPTG G with n non-
urgent locations is finitely optimal, and that the number of cutpoints of ValG(ℓ) is at most
O
(
(Πtr(|Lf |+ n
2))2n+2
)
, which suffices to show the above bound, since |Lf |+ n
2 6 |L|2.
The base case n = 0 is given by Proposition 12. Now, assume that G has at least
one non-urgent location, and consider ℓ⋆ one with minimum weight. By induction hy-
pothesis, all r′-SPTGs Gℓ⋆,r′ are finitely optimal for all r
′ ∈ [0, r]. Let r0 > r1 > · · ·
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ValG(ℓ
⋆, ν)
ν
−π(ℓ⋆)
ri+1 ri
•
•
ValG(ri)+
π(ℓ⋆)(ri− ri+1)
Figure 10: The case ℓ⋆ ∈ LMin: as the value at ri+1 is strictly below ValG(ri)+π(ℓ
⋆)(ri−ri+1),
as the slope on the left of ri and of ri+1 is −π(ℓ
⋆), there must exist a segment
(represented with a double line) with slope greater than −π(ℓ⋆) in [ri+1, ri).
be the decreasing sequence defined by r0 = r and ri = leftℓ⋆(ri−1) for all i > 1. By
Lemma 19, there exists j 6 |FG |
2 + 2 such that rj = 0. Moreover, for all 0 < i 6 j,
ValG = ValGℓ⋆,ri−1 on [ri, ri−1] by definition of ri = leftℓ
⋆(ri−1), so that ValG(ℓ) is a cost
function on this interval, for all ℓ, and the number of cutpoints on this interval is bounded
by O
(
(Πtr(|Lf |+ (n − 1)
2 + n))2(n−1)+2
)
= O
(
(Πtr(|Lf |+ n
2))2(n−1)+2
)
by induction hy-
pothesis (notice that maximal transition weights are the same in G and Gℓ⋆,ri−1 , but that
we add n more final locations in Gℓ⋆,ri−1). Adding the cutpoint 1, summing over i from 0
to j 6 |FG|
2 + 2, and observing that |FG | 6 2Π
tr|Lf |, we bound the number of cutpoints of
ValG(ℓ) by O
(
(Πtr(|Lf |+ n
2))2n+2
)
. Finally, we can reconstruct fake-optimal and optimal
strategies in G from the fake-optimal and optimal strategies of Gℓ⋆,ri .
6. Algorithms to compute the value function
The finite optimality of SPTGs allows us to compute the value functions. The proof of
Theorem 20 suggests a recursive algorithm to do so: from an SPTG G with minimal non-
urgent location ℓ⋆, solve recursively Gℓ⋆,1, Gℓ⋆,left(1), Gℓ⋆,left(left(1)), etc. handling the base case
where all locations are urgent with Algorithm 1. While our results above show that this is
correct and terminates, we propose instead to solve—without the need for recursion—the
sequence of games GL\Lu,1, GL\Lu,left(1), . . . i.e.making all locations urgent at once. Again, the
arguments given above prove that this scheme is correct, but the key argument of Lemma 19
that ensures termination cannot be applied in this case. Instead, we rely on the following
result, stating, that there will be at least one cutpoint of ValG in each interval [left(r), r].
Observe that this lemma relies on the fact that G is finitely optimal, hence the need to first
prove this fact independently with the sequence Gℓ⋆,1,Gℓ⋆,left(1),Gℓ⋆,left(left(1)), . . . Termination
then follows from the fact that ValG has finitely many cutpoints by finite optimality.
Proposition 21. Let r0 ∈ (0, 1] such that GL′,r0 is finitely optimal. Suppose that r1 =
leftL′(r0) > 0, and let r2 = leftL′(r1). There exists r
′ ∈ [r2, r1) and ℓ ∈ L
′ such that
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(1) ValG(ℓ) is affine on [r
′, r1], of slope equal to −π(ℓ), and
(2) ValG(ℓ, r1) 6= ValG(ℓ, r0) + π(ℓ)(r0 − r1).
As a consequence, ValG(ℓ) has a cutpoint in [r1, r0).
Proof. We denote by r′ the smallest clock value (smaller than r1) such that for all locations ℓ,
ValG(ℓ) is affine over [r
′, r1]. Then, the proof goes by contradiction: using Lemma 17, we
assume that for all ℓ ∈ L′ ∩ LMin (respectively, ℓ ∈ L
′ ∩ LMax)
• either (¬1) the slope of ValG(ℓ) on [r
′, r1] is greater (respectively, smaller) than −π(ℓ),
• or (1 ∧ ¬2) for all ν ∈ [r′, r1], ValG(ℓ, ν) = ValG(ℓ, r0) + π(ℓ)(r0 − ν).
Let σ0Min and σ
0
Max (respectively, σ
1
Min and σ
1
Max) be a fake-optimal NC-strategy and an
optimal FP-strategy in GL′,r0 (respectively, GL′,r1). Let r
′′ = max(pts(σ1Min) ∪ pts(σ
1
Max)) ∩
[r′, r1), so that strategies σ
1
Min and σ
1
Max have the same behaviour on all clock values of the
interval (r′′, r1), i.e. either always play urgently the same transition, or wait, in a non-urgent
location, until reaching some clock value greater than or equal to r1 and then play the same
transition.
Observe preliminarily that for all ℓ ∈ L′ ∩ LMin (respectively, ℓ ∈ L
′ ∩ LMax), if on
the interval (r′′, r1), σ
1
Min (respectively, σ
1
Max) goes to ℓ
f then the slope on [r′′, r1] (and thus
on [r′, r1]) is −π(ℓ). Thus for such a location ℓ, we know that 1∧¬2 holds for ℓ (by letting r
′
be r′′).
For other locations ℓ, we will construct a new pair of NC- and FP-strategies σMin
and σMax in GL′,r0 such that for all locations ℓ and clock values ν ∈ (r
′′, r1)
fake
σMin
GL′,r0
(ℓ, ν) 6 ValG(ℓ, ν) 6 PriceGL′,r0
((ℓ, ν), σMax) . (6.1)
As a consequence, with Lemma 5 (over game GL′,r0), one would have that ValGL′,r0
(ℓ, ν) =
ValG(ℓ, ν), which will raise a contradiction with the definition of r1 as leftL′(r0) < r0 (by
Lemma 17), and conclude the proof.
We only show the construction for σMin, as it is very similar for σMax. Strategy σMin is
obtained by combining strategies σ1Min over [0, r1], and σ
0
Min over [r1, r0]: a special care has
to be spent in case σ1Min performs a jump to a location ℓ
f , since then, in σMin, we rather glue
this move with the decision of strategy σ0Min in (ℓ, r1). Formally, let (ℓ, ν) be a configuration
of GL′,r0 with ℓ ∈ LMin. We construct σMin(ℓ, ν) as follows:
• if ν > r1, σMin(ℓ, ν) = σ
0
Min(ℓ, ν);
• if ν < r1, ℓ 6∈ L
′ and σ1Min(ℓ, ν) =
(
t, (ℓ, ℓf )
)
for some delay t (such that ν + t 6 r1), we
let σMin(ℓ, ν) =
(
r1 − ν + t
′, (ℓ, ℓ′)
)
where (t′, (ℓ, ℓ′)) = σ0Min(ℓ, r1);
• otherwise σMin(ℓ, ν) = σ
1
Min(ℓ, ν).
For all finite plays ρ in GL′,r0 that conform to σMin, start in a configuration (ℓ, ν) such
that ν ∈ (r′′, r0] and ℓ /∈ {ℓ
′f | ℓ′ ∈ L}, and end in a final location, we show by induction
that PriceGL′,r0
(ρ) 6 ValG(ℓ, ν). Note that ρ either only contains clock values in [r1, r0], or
is of the form (ℓ, ν)
c
−→ (ℓf , ν ′), or is of the form (ℓ, ν)
c
−→ ρ′ with ρ′ a run that satisfies the
above restriction.
• If ν ∈ [r1, r0], then ρ conforms with σ
0
Min, thus, as σ
0
Min is fake-optimal, PriceGL′,r0
(ρ) 6
ValGL′,r0
(ℓ, ν) = ValG(ℓ, ν) (the last inequality comes from the definition of r1 = leftL′(r0)).
Therefore, in the following cases, we assume that ν ∈ (r′′, r1).
• Consider then the case where ρ is of the form (ℓ, ν)
c
−→ (ℓf , ν ′).
34 T. BRIHAYE, G. GEERAERTS, A. HADDAD, E. LEFAUCHEUX, AND B. MONMEGE
– if ℓ ∈ L′ ∩ LMin, ℓ is urgent in GL′,r0 , thus ν
′ = ν. Furthermore, since ρ conforms
with σMin, by construction of σMin, the choice of σ
1
Min on (r
′′, r1) consists in going to ℓ
f ,
thus, as observed above, 1 ∧ ¬2 holds for ℓ. Therefore,
ValG(ℓ, ν) = ValG(ℓ, r0) + π(ℓ)(r0 − ν) = ϕℓf (ν) = PriceGL′,r0
(ρ) .
– If ℓ ∈ LMin\L
′, by construction, it must be the case that σMin(ℓ, ν) =
(
r1−ν+t
′, (ℓ, ℓf )
)
where
(
t, (ℓ, ℓf )
)
= σ1Min(ℓ, ν) and
(
t′, (ℓ, ℓf )
)
= σ0Min(ℓ, r1). Thus, ν
′ = r1 + t
′. In
particular, observe that
PriceGL′,r0
(ρ) = (r1 − ν)π(ℓ) + PriceGL′,r0
(ρ′)
where ρ′ = (ℓ, r1)
c′
−→ (ℓf , ν ′). As ρ′ conforms with σ0Min which is fake-optimal in GL′,r0 ,
and r1 = left(r0),
PriceGL′,r0
(ρ′) 6 ValGL′,r0
(ℓ, r1) = ValG(ℓ, r1) .
Thus
PriceGL′,r0
(ρ) 6 (r1 − ν)π(ℓ) + ValG(ℓ, r1) = PriceGL′,r1
(ρ′′)
where ρ′′ = (ℓ, ν)
c′′
−→ (ℓf , ν + t) conforms with σ1Min which is fake-optimal in GL′,r1 .
Therefore, since r1 = left(r0),
PriceGL′,r0
(ρ) 6 ValGL′,r1
(ℓ, ν) = ValG(ℓ, ν) .
– If ℓ ∈ LMax then
PriceGL′,r0
(ρ) = (ν ′ − ν)π(ℓ) + ϕℓf (ν
′)
= (ν ′ − ν)π(ℓ) + (r0 − ν
′)π(ℓ) + ValG(ℓ, r0)
= (r0 − ν)π(ℓ) + ValG(ℓ, r0) .
By Lemma 15, since ℓ ∈ LMax \ Lu (ℓ is not urgent in G since ℓ
f exists), ValG(ℓ, r1) >
(r0−r1)π(ℓ)+ValG(ℓ, r0). Furthermore, observe that if we define ρ
′ as the play (ℓ, ν)
c′
−→
(ℓf , ν) in GL′,r1 , then ρ
′ conforms with σ1Min and
PriceGL′,r1
(ρ′) = (r1 − ν)π(ℓ) + ValG(ℓ, r1)
> (r1 − ν)π(ℓ) + (r0 − r1)π(ℓ) + ValG(ℓ, r0)
= (r0 − ν)π(ℓ) + ValG(ℓ, r0)
= PriceGL′,r0
(ρ) .
Thus, as σ1Min is fake-optimal in GL′,r1 ,
PriceGL′,r0
(ρ) 6 PriceGL′,r1
(ρ′) 6 ValGL′,r1
(ℓ, ν) = ValG(ℓ, ν) .
• We finally consider the case where ρ = (ℓ, ν)
c
−→ ρ′ with ρ′ that starts in configura-
tion (ℓ′, ν ′) such that ℓ′ /∈ {ℓ′′f | ℓ′′ ∈ L}. By induction hypothesis PriceGL′,r0
(ρ′) 6
ValG(ℓ
′, ν ′).
– If ν ′ 6 r1, let ρ
′′ be the play of GL′,r1 starting in (ℓ
′, ν ′) that conforms with σ1Min and
σ1Max. If ρ
′′ does not reach a final location, since σ1Min is an NC-strategy, the prices
of its prefixes tend to −∞. By considering the switching strategy of Lemma 5, we
would obtain a run conforming with σ1Max of price smaller than ValGL′,r1
(ℓ′, ν ′) which
would contradict the optimality of σ1Max. Hence, ρ
′′ reaches the target. Moreover,
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since σ1Max is optimal and σ
1
Min is fake-optimal, we finally know that PriceGL′,r1
(ρ′′) =
ValGL′,r1
(ℓ′, ν ′) = ValG(ℓ
′, ν ′) (since ν ′ ∈ [left(r1), r1]). Therefore,
PriceGL′,r0
(ρ) = (ν ′ − ν)π(ℓ) + π(ℓ, ℓ′) + PriceGL′,r0
(ρ′)
6 (ν ′ − ν)π(ℓ) + π(ℓ, ℓ′) + ValG(ℓ
′, ν ′)
= (ν ′ − ν)π(ℓ) + π(ℓ, ℓ′) + Price(ρ′′) = Price((ℓ, ν)
c′
−→ ρ′′)
Since the play (ℓ, ν)
c′
−→ ρ′′ conforms with σ1Min, we finally have
PriceGL′,r0
(ρ) 6 Price((ℓ, ν)
c′
−→ ρ′′) 6 ValGL′,r1
(ℓ, ν) = ValG(ℓ, ν) .
– If ν ′ > r1 and ℓ ∈ LMax, let ρ
1 be the play in GL′,r1 defined by ρ
1 = (ℓ, ν)
c′
−→ (ℓf , ν)
and ρ0 the play in GL′,r0 defined by ρ
0 = (ℓ, r1)
c′′
−→ ρ′. We have
PriceGL′,r0
(ρ) = (ν ′ − ν)π(ℓ) + π(ℓ, ℓ′) + PriceGL′,r0
(ρ′)
= ϕℓf (ν)︸ ︷︷ ︸
= PriceG
L′,r1
(ρ1)
−ValG(ℓ, r1) + (ν
′ − r1)π(ℓ) + π(ℓ, ℓ
′) + PriceGL′,r0
(ρ′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
= PriceG
L′,r0
(ρ0)
.
Since ρ0 conforms with σ0Min, fake-optimal, and reaches a final location, and since
r1 = leftL′(r0),
PriceGL′,r0
(ρ0) 6 ValGL′,r0
(ℓ, r1) = ValG(ℓ, r1) .
We also have that ρ1 conforms with σ1Min, so the previous explanations already proved
that PriceGL′,r1
(ρ1) 6 ValG(ℓ, ν). As a consequence PriceGL′,r0
(ρ) 6 ValG(ℓ, ν).
– If ν ′ > r1 and ℓ ∈ LMin, we know that ℓ is non-urgent, so that ℓ 6∈ L
′. Therefore,
by definition of σMin, σMin(ℓ, ν) = (r1 − ν + t
′, (ℓ, ℓ′)) where σ1Min(ℓ, ν) = (t, (ℓ, ℓ
f )) for
some delay t, and σ0Min(ℓ, r1) = (t
′, (ℓ, ℓ′)). If we let ρ1 be the play in GL′,r1 defined by
ρ1 = (ℓ, ν)
c′
−→ (ℓf , ν) and ρ0 the play in GL′,r0 defined by ρ
0 = (ℓ, r1)
c′′
−→ ρ′, as in the
previous case, we obtain that PriceGL′,r0
(ρ) 6 ValG(ℓ, ν).
As a consequence of this induction, we have shown that for all ℓ ∈ L, and ν ∈ (r′′, r1),
fake
σMin
GL′,r0
(ℓ, ν) 6 ValG(ℓ, ν), which shows one inequality of (6.1), the other being obtained
very similarly.
Algorithm 2 implements these ideas. Each iteration of the while loop computes a
new game in the sequence GL\Lu,1, GL\Lu,left(1), . . . described above; solves it thanks to
solveInstant; and thus computes a new portion of ValG on an interval on the left of
the current point r ∈ [0, 1]. More precisely, the vector (ValG(ℓ, 1))ℓ∈L is first computed
in line 1. Then, the algorithm enters the while loop, and the game G′ obtained when
reaching line 6 is GL\Lu,1. Then, the algorithm enters the repeat loop to analyse this game.
Instead of building the whole value function of G′, Algorithm 2 builds only the parts of
ValG′ that coincide with ValG . It proceeds by enumerating the possible cutpoints a of ValG′ ,
starting in r, by decreasing clock values (line 8), and computes the value of ValG′ in each
cutpoint thanks to solveInstant (line 9), which yields a new piece of ValG′ . Then, the
if in line 10 checks whether this new piece coincides with ValG , using the condition given
by Proposition 14. If it is the case, the piece of ValG′ is added to fℓ (line 11); repeat is
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Algorithm 2: solve(G)
Input: SPTG G = (LMin, LMax, Lf , Lu,ϕ,∆, π)
1 f = (fℓ)ℓ∈L := solveInstant(G, 1) /* fℓ : {1} → R */
2 r := 1
3 while 0 < r do /* Invariant: fℓ : [r, 1]→ R */
4 G′ := wait(G, r,f (r)) /* r-SPTG G′ = (LMin, LMax, L
′
f , L
′
u,ϕ
′, T ′, π′) */
5 L′u := L
′
u ∪ L /* every location is made urgent */
6 b := r
7 repeat /* Invariant:fℓ : [b, 1]→ R */
8 a := max(PossCPG′ ∩ [0, b))
9 x = (xℓ)ℓ∈L := solveInstant(G
′, a) /* xℓ = ValG′(ℓ, a) */
10 if ∀ℓ ∈ LMin
fℓ(b)−xℓ
b−a 6 −π(ℓ) ∧ ∀ℓ ∈ LMax
fℓ(b)−xℓ
b−a > −π(ℓ) then
11 foreach ℓ ∈ L do fℓ :=
(
ν ∈ [a, b] 7→ fℓ(b) + (ν − b)
fℓ(b)−xℓ
b−a
)
⊲ fℓ
12 b := a ; stop := false
13 else stop := true
14 until b = 0 or stop
15 r := b
16 return f
stopped otherwise. When exiting the repeat loop, variable b has value left(1). Hence, at
the next iteration of the while loop, G′ = GL\Lu,left(1) when reaching line 6. By continuing
this reasoning inductively, one concludes that the successive iterations of the while loop
compute the sequence GL\Lu,1, GL\Lu,left(1), . . . as announced, and rebuilds ValG from them.
Termination in exponential time is ensured by Proposition 21: each iteration of the while
loop discovers at least one new cutpoint of ValG, and there are at most exponentially many
(note that a tighter bound on this number of cutpoints would entail a better complexity of
our algorithm).
Example 1. Figure 11 shows the value functions of the SPTG of Figure 1. Here is how
Algorithm 2 obtains those functions. During the first iteration of the while loop, the
algorithm computes the correct value functions until the cutpoint 34 : in the repeat loop, at
first a = 9/10 but the slope in ℓ1 is smaller than the slope that would be granted by waiting,
as depicted in Figure 1. Then, a = 3/4 where the algorithm gives a slope of value −16 in
ℓ2 while the weight of this location of Max is −14. During the first iteration of the while
loop, the inner repeat loop thus ends with r = 3/4. The next iterations of the while loop
end with r = 12 (because ℓ1 does not pass the test in line 10); r =
1
4 (because of ℓ2) and
finally with r = 0, giving us the value functions on the entire interval [0, 1].
7. Towards more complex PTGs
In [15, 16, 17], general PTGs with non-negative weights are solved by reducing them to a
finite sequence of SPTGs, by eliminating guards and resets. It is thus natural to try and
adapt these techniques to our general case, in which case Algorithm 2 would allow us to
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Figure 11: Value functions of the SPTG of Figure 1
solve general PTGs with arbitrary weights. Let us explain where are the difficulties of such
a generalisation.
The technique used to remove strict guards from the transitions of the PTGs, i.e. guards
of the form (a, b], [b, a) or (a, b) with a, b ∈ N, consists in enhancing the locations with regions
while keeping an equivalent game. This technique can be adapted to arbitrary weights.
Formally, let G = (LMin, LMax, Lf , Lu,ϕ,∆, π) be a PTG. We define the region-PTG of G
as G′ = (L′Min, L
′
Max, L
′
f , L
′
u,ϕ
′,∆′, π′) where:
• L′Min = {(ℓ, I) | ℓ ∈ LMin, I ∈ RegG};
• L′Max = {(ℓ, I) | ℓ ∈ LMax, I ∈ RegG};
• Lf = {(ℓ, I) | ℓ ∈ Lf , I ∈ RegG};
• Lu = {(ℓ, I) | ℓ ∈ Lu, I ∈ RegG};
• ∀(ℓ, I) ∈ L′f , ϕ
′
ℓ,I = ϕℓ;
• transitions given by
∆′ =
{
((ℓ, I), Ig ∩ I,R, (ℓ
′, I ′)) | (ℓ, Ig, R, ℓ
′) ∈ ∆, I ′ =
{
I if R = ⊥
{0} otherwise
}
∪WaitTr
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with
WaitTr =
{
((ℓ, (Mk,Mk+1)), {Mk+1},⊥, (ℓ, {Mk+1})) | ℓ ∈ L, (Mk,Mk+1) ∈ RegG
}
∪
{
((ℓ, {Mk}), {Mk},⊥, (ℓ, (Mk ,Mk+1))) | ℓ ∈ L, (Mk,Mk+1) ∈ RegG
}
;
• ∀(ℓ, I) ∈ L′, π′(ℓ, I) = π(ℓ); and ∀((ℓ, I), Ig, R, (ℓ
′, I ′)) ∈ ∆′,
π′((ℓ, I), Ig, R, (ℓ
′, I ′)) =
{
π(ℓ, Ig, R, ℓ) if (ℓ, Ig, R, ℓ
′) ∈ ∆
0 otherwise .
It is easy to verify that, in all configurations ((ℓ, {Mk}), ν) reachable from the clock value
0, the clock value ν is Mk. More interestingly, in all configurations ((ℓ, (Mk,Mk+1)), ν)
reachable from the clock value 0, the clock value ν is in [Mk,Mk+1]: indeed if ν = Mk
(respectively, Mk+1), it intuitively simulates a configuration of the original game with a
clock value arbitrarily close to Mk, but greater than Mk (respectively, smaller than Mk+1).
The game can thus take transitions with guard x > Mk, but cannot take transitions with
guard x =Mk anymore.
Lemma 22. Let G be a PTG, and G′ be its region-PTG defined as before. For (ℓ, I) ∈
L× RegG and ν ∈ I, ValG(ℓ, ν) = ValG′((ℓ, I), ν). Moreover, we can transform an ε-optimal
strategy of G′ into an ε′-optimal strategy of G with ε′ < 2ε and vice-versa.
Proof. The proof consists in replacing strategies of G′ where players can play on the borders
of regions, by strategies of G that play increasingly close to the border as time passes. If
played close enough, the loss created can be chosen as small as we want.
Let G be a PTG, G′ be its region-PTG. First, for ε > 0, we create a transformation g
of the plays of G′ which do not end with a waiting transition to the plays of G. It is defined
by induction on the length n of the plays so that for a play ρ of length n we have
• |Price(ρ)− Price(g(ρ))| 6 2Πloc(1− 12n )ε; and
• there exists ℓ ∈ L and I ∈ RegG such that g(ρ) and ρ ends in the locations ℓ and (ℓ, I)
and their clock values are both in I and differ of at most 12n+1 ε.
If n = 0, let ρ = ((ℓ, I), ν) be a play of G′ of length 0, then g(ρ) = (ℓ, ν ′), where
ν ′ = ν ± ε2 if I is not an interval and ν is an endpoint of I, and ν
′ = ν otherwise (so that
ν ′ ∈ I in every case).
For n > 0, we suppose g defined on every play of length at most n which does not end
with a waiting transition. Let ρ = ((q1, I1), ν1)
t1,δ1,c1
−−−−→ . . .
tn,δn,cn
−−−−−→ ((qn, In), νn)
tn+1,δn+1,cn+1
−−−−−−−−−→
((qn+1, In+1), νn+1) with δn+1 /∈ WaitTr. Let last = max({k 6 n | trk /∈ WaitTr}) (with
max ∅ = 0). Then, by induction, there exists ρ′ = (q1, ν1) → · · · → (qlast+1, v
′
last+1) such
that
• g(ρ|last) = ρ
′ (where ρ|last is the prefix of length last of ρ),
• |Price(ρ|last)− Price(g(ρ|last))| 6 2Π
loc(1− 1
2last
)ε, and
• |ν ′last+1 − νlast+1| 6
1
2last+1
ε.
Then we choose g(ρ) = ρ′
t,δn+1,c
−−−−−→ (qn+1, ν
′
n+1) where
• if δn+1 is enabled in G in (qlast+1 = qn, νn + tn+1), t = νn + tn+1 − ν
′
last;
• otherwise, as the guards of G′ are the closure of the guards of G, then there exists z ∈
{1,−1} such that for t = νn + tn+1 − ν
′
last +
zε
2n+2
, δn+1 is enabled in G and ν
′
last + t and
νn + tn+1 belong to the same region.
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Thus, in both cases, |νn+1 − ν
′
n+1| 6
ε
2n+2
and νn+1 6= ν
′
n+1 iff I is not a singleton, νn+1 is
on a border, ν ′n+1 is close to this border and δn+1 does not contain a reset. Moreover,
|Price(ρ)− Price(g(ρ))| = |Price(ρ|last) + (νn+1 − νlast)π(qlast) + π(δn+1)− Price(g(ρ))|
6 |Price(ρ|last)− Price(g(ρ|last))|
+ |(νn+1 − νlast)π(qlast) + π(δn+1) + Price(g(ρ|last))− Price(g(ρ))|
6 2Πloc(1−
1
2last
)ε+ |(ν ′last − νlast)π(qlast) + (νn+1 − ν
′
n+1)π(qlast)|
6 2Πloc(1−
1
2last
)ε+
∣∣∣ ε
2last+1
π(qlast)
∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣ ε
2n+2
π(qlast)
∣∣∣
6 2Πloc(1−
1
2last
)ε+
Πlocε
2last+1
+
Πlocε
2n+2
6 2Πloc(1−
1
2last+1
)ε
6 2Πloc(1−
1
2n+1
)ε .
Let σMin be a strategy of Min in G. Using the transformation g, we will build by
induction a strategy σ′Min in G
′ such that for all plays ρ whose last transition does not
belong to WaitTr and conforming with σ′Min, g(ρ) conforms with σMin.
Let ρ be a play of G′ whose last transition does not belong to WaitTr such that g(ρ)
conforms with σMin (which is the case of all plays of length 0). ρ and g(ρ) ends in the
locations (q, I) and q respectively.
• If ρ ends in a configuration of Max, then the choice does not depend on σMin or σ
′
Min.
Let (t, δ) be a choice of Max in G′ with price c. If δ belongs to WaitTr, then the new
configuration also belongs to Max where it will make another choice. Let ρ′ be the
extension of ρ until the first transition δ′ such that δ′ /∈WaitTr. The play g(ρ′) conforms
with σMin as the configuration where g(ρ) ends is controlled by Max and g(ρ
′) only has
one more transition than g(ρ).
• If ρ ends in configuration of Min, then there exists t, δ, c, q′, ν ′ such that g(ρ)
t,δ,c
−−→ (q′, ν ′)
conforms with σMin. As taking a waiting transition does not change the ownership of the
configuration, we consider here multiple successive choices of Min as one choice: σ′Min(ρ) is
such that ρ′ = ρ
t1,δ1,c1
−−−−→ . . .
tk,δk,ck−−−−−→ ((q, I ′′), ν)
tk+1,δ,ck+1
−−−−−−−→ ((q′, I ′), ν ′) where ∀i 6 k, δi ∈
WaitTr conforms with σ′Min. This is possible as if δ is allowed in a configuration (q, ν)
in G then it is allowed too in a configuration ((q, I), ν) with the appropriate I. Then
g(ρ′) = g(ρ)
δ,tr,c
−−−→ (q′, ν ′), thus g(ρ′) conforms with σMin.
As no accepting plays of G′ end with a transition of WaitTr, every accepting play ρ
conforming with σ′Min verifies that g(ρ) conforms with σMin. Thus for every configuration s,
PriceG′(s, σ
′
Min) 6 PriceG(s, σMin) + 2Π
locε. Therefore ValG′(s) 6 ValG(s).
Reciprocally, let σ′Min be a strategy of Min in G
′. We will now build by induction
a strategy σMin in G such that for all plays ρ conforming with σMin, there exists a play
in g−1(ρ) that conforms with σ′Min.
Let ρ be a play of G conforming with σMin such that there exists ρ
′ ∈ g−1(ρ) con-
forming with σ′Min (which is the case of all plays of length 0). Plays ρ
′ and ρ end in the
configurations ((q, I), ν ′) and (q, ν) respectively.
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• If ρ ends in configuration of Max, then the choice does not depend on σMin or σ
′
Min.
Let (t, δ) be a choice of Max in G with price c and let ρ˜ be the extension of ρ by this choice.
There exists (t1, δ1, c1), . . . , (tk+1, δk+1, ck+1) such that ∀i 6 k, δi ∈WaitTr, δk+1 = δ and∑k+1
i=1 ti = ν+ t−ν
′. Let ρc = ρ
′ t1,δ1,c1−−−−→ · · ·
tk,δk,ck−−−−−→ ((q, I ′′), νk)
tk+1,δ,ck+1
−−−−−−−→ ((q′, I ′), νk+1),
then ρc conforms with σ
′
Min (as Min did not take a single decision) and g(ρc) = ρ˜.
• If ρ ends in a configuration of Min, then there exists a play ρc = ρ
t1,δ1,c1
−−−−→ . . .
tk,δk,ck−−−−−→
((q, I ′′), νk)
tk+1,δ,ck+1
−−−−−−−→ ((q′, I ′), νk+1) such that ρc conforms with σ
′
Min. We choose σMin(ρ) =
(t, δ) such that for the adequate price c, g(ρc) = ρ
t,δ,c
−−→ (q′, v′′). This is possible as
t+ ν ′ ∈ I ′′.
Every accepting play ρ conforming with σMin verifies ∃ρ
′ ∈ g−1(ρ) conforming with σMin.
Thus for every configuration s, PriceG(s, σMin) 6 PriceG′(s, σMin)+2Π
locε. Therefore ValG′(s) >
ValG(s). Hence ValG′(s) = ValG(s).
The technique used in [15, 16, 17] to remove resets from PTGs, however, consists in
bounding the number of clock resets that can occur in each play following an optimal strategy
ofMin orMax. Then, the PTG can be unfolded into a reset-acyclic PTG with the same value.
By reset-acyclic, we mean that no cycles in the configuration graph visit a transition with a
reset. This reset-acyclic PTG can be decomposed into a finite number of components that
contain no reset and are linked by transitions with resets. These components can be solved
iteratively, from the bottom to the top, turning them into SPTGs. Thus, if we assume that
the PTGs we are given as input are reset-acyclic, we can solve them in exponential time,
and show that their value functions are cost functions with at most exponentially many
cutpoints, using our techniques.
In [15] the authors showed that with one-clock PTG and non-negative weights only we
could bound the number of resets by the number of locations, without changing the value
functions. Unfortunately, these arguments do not hold for arbitrary weights, as shown by
the PTG in Figure 12. In that PTG, we claim that Val(ℓ0) = 0; that Min has no optimal
strategies, but a family of ε-optimal strategies σεMin each with value ε; and that each σ
ε
Min
requires memory whose size depends on ε and might yield a play visiting at least 1/ε times
the reset between ℓ0 and ℓ1 (hence the number of resets cannot be bounded). For all ε > 0,
σεMin consists in: waiting 1− ε time units in ℓ0, then going to ℓ1 during the ⌈1/ε⌉ first visits
to ℓ0; and to go directly to ℓf afterwards. Against σ
ε
Min, Max has two possible choices:
(1) either wait 0 time unit in ℓ1, wait ε time units in ℓ2, then reach ℓf ; or
(2) wait ε time unit in ℓ1 then force the cycle by going back to ℓ0 and wait for Min’s next
move.
Thus, all plays according to σεMin will visit a sequence of locations which is either of the
form ℓ0(ℓ1ℓ0)
kℓ1ℓ2ℓf , with 0 6 k < ⌈1/ε⌉; or of the form ℓ0(ℓ1ℓ0)
⌈ 1ε⌉ℓf . In the former case,
the price of the play will be −kε+ 0 + ε = −(k − 1)ε 6 ε; in the latter, −ε(⌈1/ε⌉) + 1 6 0.
This shows that Val(ℓ0) = 0, but there are no optimal strategies as none of these strategies
allow one to guarantee a price of 0 (neither does the strategy that waits 1 time unit in ℓ0).
If bounding the number of resets is not possible in the general case, it could be done
if one adds constraints on the cycles of the game. This kind of restriction was used in [26]
where they introduce the notion of robust games (and a more restrictive one of divergent
games was used in [19]). Such games require among other things that there exists κ > 0
such that every play starting and ending in the same pair location and time region has either
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ℓ0
0
ℓ1
−1
ℓ2 1
ℓf
x = 1
x 6 1
x 6 1
x = 1, x := 0
1
Figure 12: A PTG where the number of resets in optimal plays cannot be bounded a priori.
ℓ00 ℓ1 −1
ℓf
1, x < 1 0 < x < 1
x < 1
−1, x < 1, x := 0
ℓ0, {0}0
ℓ0, [0, 1]0 ℓ1, [0, 1] −1
ℓ1, {0} −1
ℓf
x = 0 x = 0
11
−1, x :=
0
−1
Figure 13: A 1-NRAPTG and its region PTG (some guards removed for better readability)
a positive price or a price smaller than −κ. Here we require a less powerful assumption as
we put this restriction only on cycles containing a reset.
Definition 6. Given κ > 0, a κ-negative-reset-acyclic PTG (κ-NRAPTG) is a PTG where
for every location ℓ ∈ L and every cyclic finite play ρ starting and ending in (ℓ, 0), either
Price(ρ) > 0 or Price(ρ) < −κ.
The PTG of Figure 12 is not a κ-NRAPTG for any κ > 0 as the play (ℓ0, 0)
0
−→
(ℓ1, 1 − κ/2)
−κ/2
−−−→ (ℓ0, 0) is a cycle containing a reset and with a negative price strictly
greater than −κ. On the contrary, in Figure 13 we show a 1-NRAPTG and its region PTG.
Here, every cycle containing a reset is between ℓ0 and ℓ1 and such cycles have at most price
−1. The value of this PTG is 0 but no strategies for Max can achieve it because of the
guard x > 0. As this guard is not strict anymore in the region PTG, both player have an
optimal strategy in this game (this is not always the case).
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In order to bound the number of resets of a κ-NRAPTG, we first prove a bound on the
value of such games, that will be useful in the following. We let k = |RegG | be the number
of regions.
Lemma 23. For all κ-NRAPTGs G, for all (ℓ, ν) ∈ ConfG: either ValG(ℓ, ν) ∈ {−∞,+∞}, or
−|L|MΠloc − |L|2(|L|+ 2)Πtr 6 ValG(ℓ, ν) 6 |L|MΠ
loc + |L|kΠtr .
Proof. Consider the case where ValG(ℓ, ν) /∈ {−∞,+∞}. Let κ > 2ε > 0. Then, there exist
σMin and σMax ε-optimal strategies for Min and Max, respectively.
Let σ¬cMin be any memoryless strategy of Min in the reachability timed game induced by
G such that no play consistent with σ¬cMin goes twice in the same couple (location, region).
If such a strategy does not exist, as the clock constraints are the same during the first and
second occurrences of this couple, Max can enforce the cycle infinitely often, thus the reacha-
bility game is winning for it and the value of G is +∞. Let us note ρ = Play((ℓ, ν), σ¬cMin, σMax).
By ε-optimality of σMax, Price(ρ) > ValG(ℓ, ν) − ε. Let Price
tr(ρ) be the price of ρ due to
the weights of the transitions, and Priceloc(ρ) be the weight due to the time elapsed in
the locations of the game: Price(ρ) = Pricetr(ρ) + Priceloc(ρ). As there are no cycles in
the game according to couples (location, region), there are at most |L|k transitions, thus
Pricetr(ρ) 6 |L|kΠtr. Moreover, the absence of cycles also implies that we do not take two
transitions with a reset ending in the same location or one transition with a reset ending in
the initial location, thus we take at most |L| − 1 such transitions. Therefore at most |L|M
units of time elapsed and Priceloc(ρ) 6 |L|MΠloc. This implies that
ValG(ℓ, ν)− ε 6 Price(ρ) 6 |L|MΠ
loc + |L|kΠtr .
By taking the limit of ε towards 0, we obtain the announced upper bound.
We now prove the lower bound on the value. To that extent, consider now the play
ρ = Play((ℓ, ν), σMin, σMax). We have that Price(ρ) 6 ValG(ℓ, ν) + ε.
We want to lower bound the prince of ρ, therefore non-negative cycles can be safely
ignored. Let us show that there are no negative cycles around a transition with a reset. If
it was the case, since the game is a κ-NRAPTG, this cycle has price at most −κ. Since the
strategy σMax is ε-optimal, and κ > ε, it is not possible that σMax decides alone to take this
bad cycle. Therefore, σMin has the capability to enforce this cycle, and to exit it (otherwise,
Max would keep it inside to get value +∞): but then, Min could decide to cycle as long
as it wants, then guaranteeing a value as low as possible, which contradicts the fact that
Val(ℓ, ν) /∈ {−∞,+∞}. Therefore, the only cycles in ρ around transitions with resets, are
non-negative cycles. This implies that its price is bounded below by the price of a sub-play
obtained by removing the cycles in ρ.
We now consider a play where each reset transition is taken at most once in ρ, and
lower-bound its price.
If ρ contains a cycle around a location ℓ′ ∈ LMax without reset transitions, this cycle
has the form (ℓ′, ν ′)
c′
−→ (ℓ′′, ν ′ + t) · · ·
c′′
−→ (ℓ′, ν ′′) with ν ′′ > ν ′, followed in ρ by a transition
towards configuration (ℓ′′′, ν ′′ + t′). Thus, another strategy for Max could have consisted
in skipping the cycle by choosing as delay in the first location ℓ′, ν ′′ − ν ′ + t′ instead of
t. This would get a new strategy that cannot make the price increase above ValG(ℓ, ν) + ε,
since it is still playing against an ε-optimal strategy of Min. Therefore, we can consider the
sub-play ρf of ρ where all such cycles are removes: we still have Price(ρf ) 6 ValG(ℓ, ν) + ε.
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Suppose now that ρf contains a cycle around a location ℓ
′ ∈ LMin without reset tran-
sitions, of the form (ℓ′, ν ′)
c′
−→ (ℓ′′, ν ′ + t) · · ·
c′′
−→ (ℓ′, ν ′′) with ν and ν ′ in the same region,
composed of Min’s locations only, and followed in ρ by a transition towards configuration
(ℓ′′′, ν ′′ + t′). Then, the transition weight of this cycle is non-negative, otherwise Min could
enforce this cycle it entirely controls, while letting only a bounded time pass (smaller and
smaller as the number of cycles grow). This is not possible.
Therefore, we have that two occurrences of a same Max’s location in ρf are separated
by a reset transition and two occurrences of a same Min’s couple (location,region) are either
separated by a reset or by a Max’s location. As there is at most |L| − 1 resets, |L| locations
of Max and |L|k couples (location,region) for Min, ρt contains at most |L|
2 locations of Max
and |L|k(|L|2 + |L| − 1 + 1) locations of Min, which makes for at most |L|2(|L|k + k + 1)
locations. Thus Priceloc(ρt) > −|L|
2(|L|k+k+1)Πloc. Moreover, as at most |L|−1 resets are
taken in ρf and that the game is bounded by M , Price
loc(ρf ) > −|L|MΠ
loc. This implies
that
ValG(ℓ, ν) + ε > Price
loc(ρf ) + Price
tr(ρt) > −|L|MΠ
loc − |L|2(|L|k + k + 1)Πtr .
Taking the limit when ε tends to 0, we obtain the desired lower bound.
Using this bound on the value of a κ-NRAPTG, one can give a bound on the number
of cycles needed to be allowed. The idea is that if a reset is taken twice and the generated
cycle has positive price, either Min can modify its strategy so that it does not take this cycle
or the value of the game is +∞ as Max can stop Min to reach an accepting location. On
the contrary if the cycle has negative price, then by definition of a κ-NRAPTG, this price
is less than −κ. Thus by allowing enough such cycles, as we have bounds on the values of
the game, we know when we will have enough cycles to get under the lower bound of the
value of the game. By solving the copies of the game, if we reach a value that is smaller
than the lower bound of the value, then it means that the value is −∞.
Lemma 24. For all κ > 0, the value of a κ-NRAPTG can be computed by solving k =
⌈κ × 2n(νsup − νinf )⌉ PTGs without resets and using the same set of guards where ν
sup
and νinf are the upper and lower bound of the value of the game given by Lemma 23.
Moreover, from ε-optimal strategies on those k games, we can build kε-optimal strategies
in the original game.
With this, we can conclude:
Theorem 25. Let κ > 0 and G be a κ-NRAPTG. Then for every location q ∈ Q, the
function v 7→ V alG(q, ν) is computable in EXPTIME and are piecewise-affine functions
with at most an exponential number of cutpoints. Moreover, for every ε > 0, there exist
(and we can effectively compute) ε-optimal strategies for both players.
The robust games defined in [26] restricted to one-clock are a subset of the NRAPTG,
therefore their value is computable with the same complexity. While we cannot extend the
computation of the value to all (one-clock) PTGs, we can still obtain information on the
nature of the value function:
Theorem 26. The value functions of all one-clock PTGs are cost functions with at most
exponentially many cutpoints.
Proof. Let G be a one-clock PTG. Let us replace all transitions (ℓ, g,⊤, ℓ′) resetting the
clock by (ℓ, g,⊥, ℓ′′), where ℓ′′ is a new final location with ϕℓ′′ = ValG(ℓ, 0)—observe that
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ValG(ℓ, 0) exists even if we cannot compute it, so this transformation is well-defined. This
yields a reset-acyclic PTG G′ such that ValG′ = ValG .
8. Conclusion
In this work, we study, for the first time, priced timed games with arbitrary weights and one
clock, showing how to compute optimal values and strategies in exponential time for the
special case of simple games. This complexity result is comparable with previously obtained
results in the case of non-negative weights only [17, 16], even though we follow different paths
to prove termination and correction (due to the presence of negative weights). In order to
push our algorithm as far as we can, we introduce the class of negative-reset-acyclic games
for which we obtain the same result: as a particular case, we can solve all priced timed
games with one clock for which the clock is reset in every cycle of the underlying region
automaton. As future works, it is appealing to solve the full class of priced timed games
with arbitrary weights and one clock. We have shown why our technique seems to break in
this more general setting, thus it could be interesting to study the difficult negative cycles
without reset as their own, with different techniques.
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